The
premise I start with is that Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing
of Terrorism (AML/CFT) is not the principal financial regulatory issue
affecting the Commonwealth Caribbean today.
The real issue is the misinterpretation and misapplication of the
regulations by international, regional and local regulators. De-risking, or the dumping by US and Canadian
banks of their long-standing relationships with reputable Eastern Caribbean
banks, out of an irrational fear that they will be prosecuted for processing
money-laundering banking transactions with us, is but an extreme example of the
misapplication and abuse of AML/CFT regulation.
Anguilla, like many of our small island
Territories, has no income tax, capital gains tax or value added tax. It is a 100% tax-free jurisdiction, so far as
personal and corporate income, capital gains and estate taxes, are concerned. For decades we have had no currency exchange
restrictions, while others did and some still do. In Anguilla, one has always been able to open
a bank account in EC or US dollars, euros or sterling, or whatever currency you
could persuade the bank to accept.
The Anguilla Government raises revenue
principally through indirect taxation such as customs duties and licence fees. Everything sold in Anguilla is effectively subject
to customs duties, since Anguilla produces little or nothing of what it
consumes. If you don’t want to pay the
exorbitant duty on Champagne, then buy Bordeaux. Licence fees are entirely voluntary. If you don’t want to pay the exorbitant fee for
a gun licence or a dog licence, then don’t own a gun or a dog.
For decades, our lack of income or capital
gains tax, and easy access to foreign currency, have proven useful to regional
and international entrepreneurs. They
incorporate a company in Anguilla to do business in Anguilla and elsewhere, and
take advantage of these characteristics.
Licensed company managers manage these companies. A significant portion of the licensees of the
Financial Services Commission (FSC) of Anguilla comprises company managers who
provide management services to over 20,000 companies of which about 275 are
insurance companies, mostly captive insurance companies.
There are some 60 licensed company managers, directly
or indirectly supporting the employment of approximately 250 persons in
Anguilla. The resulting International
Financial Services Industry is the second largest contributor to the Anguilla
government’s revenue, and it represents some 25-30% of GDP, if we include the
banks. Additionally, Anguilla is among
the top 10 domiciles for captive insurance companies.[1] International Business Companies (IBCs) are
cheap to form, and popular among Far Eastern clients. Yet, Anguilla is miniscule in comparison to
the financial services industries of the major financial centres of New York,
London, Delaware and Wyoming.
In Anguilla, the FSC regulates for AML/CFT
compliance under the Proceeds of Crime Act (POCA). POCA derives from the Financial Action Task
Force (FATF) formed in 1989. The FSC
regulates company managers, insurance companies and intermediaries, investment
funds, money services businesses, trust companies, and offshore banks. Typically, licensees are required to do a
business risk assessment;[2] a
customer risk assessment;[3] collect
identification and verification information on the customer;[4] engage
in ongoing risk-based due diligence; and, prepare and enforce an AML/CFT
Policies & Procedures Manual.[5]
In 2009, Anguilla was inspected regarding the
3rd Mutual Evaluation Process (MEP) using the previous FATF methodology of 40+9
recommendations. We spent the next 5
years addressing the deficiencies identified in that report, and we successfully
exited the 3rd round MEP at the XLII CFATF[6] plenary
in November 2015 held in Port-of-Spain.
The 4th round MEP, using the new revised FATF standards, is currently
underway around the world, including the CFATF region. According to the CFATF programme, Anguilla’s
date for the next MEP inspection visit is the 3rd quarter of 2020. I have no doubt that when our report comes we
shall demonstrate 100% compliance with the AML/CFT regime.
While, to a great extent, AML/CFT regulation
is a reasonable way to address international criminal activity, the real
problem is that the rules aren’t enforced in the US to the same extent as is
expected in smaller economies. That is
changing, but slowly.
The alphabet soup of OECD,[7] G-20,[8] FATF,[9] CFATF,
and the Egmont Group,[10] all
claim to be focussed on preventing financial service providers from laundering dirty
money, and financing terrorism. Not that
any launderer of dirty money needs to come to the West Indies. At any Walmart, he can buy a US$9,999.00
debit card in an anonymous name and spend it anywhere in the world he wants. New York,[11] London,[12] Taiwan,[13] Hong
Kong,[14] and
Singapore[15]
are widely acknowledged to be the five major money laundering capitals of the
financial world. A 12 July 2016 “Reuters
Investigates” article claims that Delaware, Wyoming and Nevada are “hotbeds for the formation of anonymous shell
companies.”[16] Yet, there is no sign that their banks face
de-risking.
With increasing globalisation, the large,
oppressively taxed jurisdictions find they are losing their tax dollars to our
more competitive tax jurisdictions. While
there are some who believe that there is no economic rationale for
incorporations in tax-free jurisdictions, other than to evade tax, what the
foreign regulators, egged on by some in government and certain lobby groups, really
lust for is their missing tax dollars. Foreign
lobbyists demand that their governments force us to comply with increasingly
complex due-diligence regulation, which they claim is targeted at AML/CFT, but
which, in reality, is no more than their attempt to crush their fiscal
competitors.
The US and the EU demand that we supply CFT
information, but they don’t keep their own houses in order. They don’t acknowledge their own involvement
in money laundering and financing of terrorism.
They don’t admit their history.
The City of London and Wall Street would not be financial centres if it
were not for money laundering and financing of terrorism. Their leaders engage in nothing but posturing
and constant electioneering. They have
never played fair.
The result for us of this confusion of
purpose among the international regulators and lobbyists is increasing distress
and damage to our financial services industry and economies. The rules are often misinterpreted and misapplied
by local regulators[17] in our
countries, resulting in further damage to our financial systems and economic growth.
Even the international and regional
regulators can misapply their own regulations.
In May 2015, the CFATF made an AML/CFT presentation in Anguilla to the
FSC’s licensees. There is a distinct
difference between the due diligence required of a bank and that required of a
company manager or even an insurance company, for obvious reasons. A bank takes deposits from its customers, and
must be subject to a higher standard of regulation. So, to a certain extent, are insurance
companies. A company manager, on the
other hand, is prohibited by section 19 of the Companies Management Act
from receiving funds in trust for its client.
And, so its due diligence requirements are less stringent. Now, whilst POCA makes no distinction based
on the type of financial services business engaged in, the extent of ongoing
monitoring in a bank will in practice be different from that by a company
manager, due to the fact that the bank is in the business of intermediating
transactions and has a much more active day to day monitoring responsibility.
As the CFATF presentation proceeded, it
became evident that they were advising their audience that they were all
required to follow the banks’ need to analyse and study financial
transactions. Licensed company managers
don’t engage in the financial transactions of their clients. This was clearly wrong advice for the
audience in question, consisting as it did mainly of company managers.
Recently, a major international insurance
company registered a subsidiary insurance company to do business in
Anguilla. This subsidiary met all the
due diligence requirements, and was granted a Class A Insurance Licence by the
FSC. For several reasons, it required a
bank account in Anguilla. Under the FSC
statutes, a licensed insurer is required to hold reserves in a bank account in
Anguilla. The bank administers a lien
over this bank account in favour of the FSC.
Additionally, the Anguillian subsidiary was doing local insurance
business. It needed a bank account to
conduct this business. Yet, when it
attempted to open a bank account, the bank, probably instructed by head office
in North America, advised that the AML/CFT regulations prohibited an “offshore”
company from opening a domestic bank account.
It took an immense amount of negotiation and work before the bank could
be persuaded that this was not an offshore company or an IBC, and that this was
legitimate insurance business.
Some months ago, a Trinidadian company won a
bid on a contract for a new hotel on another island. The contractor had a problem. Some of the necessary materials were
available only in the USA and Europe.
Trinidadian industry is burdened with currency exchange restrictions
imposed and enforced by their Central Bank.
It takes forever to get permission to purchase foreign currency. If the contractor applied for permission
every time it placed an order for materials, it would miss its construction
deadlines.
The obvious solution was to set up an
Anguillian company, capitalised by a one-time authorised injection of US
dollars deposited in Anguilla. The company
in Anguilla would order and pay for the materials, and have them shipped to the
project. When the job was done, the
profits would be dividended back to Trinidad, and taxes paid on the profits.
The subsidiary company in question was an
ordinary private company registered under the Companies Act of
Anguilla. It obtained a Caribbean
Trading Business Licence, and hired staff in Anguilla. It submitted the necessary documents to a
local bank, and opened an account to be able to ensure it processed the letters
of credit and other financial instruments it needed to have the materials
ordered and paid for.
As there is no income tax in Anguilla, there
is no statutory requirement for any trading company’s accounts to be audited,
unless it is a public company. Few
businesses, save for public companies and licensed financial institutions, are
in fact audited. Under section 126 of
the Companies Act, all that the directors of an ordinary trading company
are required to do is to be able to ascertain the assets and liabilities and
the financial status of the company.
Their bank is entitled to ask for their internal financial statements,
not for audited accounts.
The bank, no doubt instructed by head office
in North America, notified the company that, as it did not have audited
financial statements as required, it was in breach of the Companies Act
and the AML/CFT regulations. The bank
was therefore obliged to close the account.
The bank did not understand that in Anguilla only public companies, or
licensees of the FSC, are required to audit their accounts.
It took a lot of effort: legal opinions,
conferences and correspondence, before the company could persuade the bank that
it was in full compliance with all the applicable laws and regulations, and
could keep its account.
The continued existence of our region’s
corresponding banking relationships depends on all our compliance with AML
regulation. We are glad to be able to
comply with international regulatory standards, if that will ensure our
continuing to enjoy vital corresponding banking relations. Without this we shall not be able to settle
credit card payments or clear US dollar denominated transactions.
I am not aware of any US bank that has been
fined as a result of doing business in the Eastern Caribbean. The Eastern Caribbean is not the same risk to
US and Canadian banks as are Wyoming, Switzerland, Paris or London, or even
Western Caribbean countries such as Belize, El Salvador or Columbia. It would appear that the international banks’
threatened removal of our corresponding banking relationships has more to do
with US politics and xenophobia, and their desire for a non-level playing
field, than from any genuine risk that we expose them to. Indeed, our business is of no real importance
for foreign banks. We are so
insignificant in substance that doing banking business with us is at most a
mere nuisance to them. From their point
of view, because of their AML/CFT due diligence obligations, the cost/reward
ratio has changed to our disadvantage.
In my view, however, we need to move on from bemoaning
the unfairness of the world, and find a way to profit from the ever-increasing
regulatory and taxation burdens that affect not only the Caribbean but the
“onshore” world as well. Things aren’t
going to go back to the way they were, and the bigger economies will never make
decisions to benefit competitors. We
simply have to be more inventive and learn to identify and use the new
opportunities for serving our clients that continuously arise.
FATCA,[18] for
example, presents an opportunity for progressive and inventive bankers and
company managers. FATCA is related to
policing “passive” income reporting and not “active” income. Where a US client invests his or her money in
an active corporate equity opportunity in one of our countries, such as villa
operations and other businesses, instead of in passive, bank term-deposits, he
or she can permanently and legitimately defer all US tax requirements until
repatriation, and should not be subject to FATCA. Think of the Apple, Google and Starbucks
examples, and the trillions of dollars of active income earnings not as yet
taxed.
CFATF and the other regulators are very
important for our international financial services industry in the Commonwealth
Caribbean, and indeed to our entire economies.
If we do not get a good report card from them, we are liable to be put
on a black list and to lose our corresponding banking relationships. The industry is anxious to ensure that it
complies with all the regulations, but it remains an uphill struggle to
persuade the regulators that the industry is a legitimate one and that it does
not harbour money launderers and terrorists.
A paper delivered at a Panel
Discussion on the topic, “Financial Regulatory Issues Affecting the
Commonwealth Caribbean” at the OECS Bar Association’s Annual Law Fair and
Conference held in Saint Lucia.
Friday 16 September 2016
[2] Under section 16(1) (f) of the AML/CFT
Regulations and as detailed under section 3 of the AML/CFT Code 2013.
[3] Under section 10 of the AML/CFT Regulations
and section 10 of the AML/CFT Code.
[4] Undersection 10 of the AML/CFT Regulations
and sections 13 and 14 of the AML/CFT Code.
[5] Under section 16 of the AML/CFT Regulations.
[6]
The
Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF) is an organisation of
twenty-seven jurisdictions of the Caribbean Basin Region, which have agreed to
implement the international standards for AML/CFT Financial Action Task Force
Recommendations (the FATF Recommendations): https://www.cfatf-gafic.org/.
[7] The mission of the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development is to promote policies that will improve the
economic and social well-being of people around the world. It was established
in 1961, with its headquarters in Paris, and has an annual budget of over €360
million: http://www.oecd.org/about/
[8] The Group of 20 nations is an international
forum for economic co-operation which was started in 1999 in the aftermath of
the Asia financial crisis by its members’ Finance Ministers and Central Bank
Governors. It became established in 2008
after the collapse of Lehman Brothers as a Summit for its members’ leaders. http://www.b20coalition.org/about-g20.php
[9] The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) on
anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism was established
by the G-7 Summit that was held in Paris in 1989: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/about/
[10] The Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence
Units is an informal network of national financial intelligence units (FIUs). National FIUs collect information on
suspicious or unusual financial activity from the financial industry and other
entities or professions required to report transactions suspected of being
money laundering or terrorism financing:
http://www.egmontgroup.org/about
[11] See the New York Post’s 13 August 2016
article headlined, “Money Laundering has Wall Street Freaking Out”: http://nypost.com/2016/08/13/money-laundering-has-wall-street-freaking-out/ .
[12] See
the Independent Newspaper’s 4th July 2015 article headlined, “London is now the
global money-laundering centre for the drug trade, says crime expert”: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/london-is-now-the-global-money-laundering-centre-for-the-drug-trade-says-crime-expert-10366262.html
[13] The Mega Financial Holding scandal: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-08-31/taiwanese-bank-chief-quits-after-u-s-money-laundering-breaches
[14] As revealed by the Panama Papers: http://www.theepochtimes.com/n3/2023992-hong-kong-becomes-money-laundering-hub/
[16] Reuters Investigates: http://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usa-banking-caribbean/
[17] By which I mean the money laundering reporting officer (MLRO) and the money laundering
compliance officer (MLCO), both of which are required under POCA.
[18] The Foreign Tax Compliance Act, 2010,
requires foreign financial institutions to report assets and identify
information relating to suspected US persons using their institutions or risk
penalties: https://www.irs.gov/businesses/corporations/foreign-account-tax-compliance-act-fatca