Showing posts with label Standards. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Standards. Show all posts

Saturday, December 16, 2023

Banking in Anguilla

 

Most nights, I awaken early, shaken by fear for the National Commercial Bank of Anguilla (NCBA). It boasts that it controls more than half of the banking business in Anguilla. This year, after only seven years of operating, it claims to have accumulated assets of over one billion EC dollars.

Each morning before the radio news, there is an advertisement for the bank. A perky female voice falsely claims that NCBA is the oldest indigenous bank in Anguilla. NCBA was in fact incorporated in Anguilla and commenced business only in 2016, making it the youngest bank.

Scotia Bank Anguilla was incorporated in Anguilla and commenced business as far back as the year 1989. As it is still in operation, it qualifies as the oldest indigenous Anguillian bank. It was acquired by Republic Bank of Trinidad in 2019 and changed its name, but by virtue of its incorporation in Anguilla in 1989 it qualifies as an indigenous bank and is by far the older.

National Bank of Anguilla (NBA) made the same boast of controlling more than half of the banking business in Anguilla up to the day it was taken over by the conservators in 2013 and ceased to do business. Its board of directors recklessly lent out the bank’s depositors’ money to borrowers who were rich in land but who had very little prospect of being able to pay back the loans: a mortal sin in banking business as any reputable banker will tell you.

At the time then, as now, there was little market for distressed properties, and attempts to sell the real estate of defaulting borrowers at full market value had no success. Yet, the directors continued to accept real estate as security for increasingly insecure loans, even as the bank approached bankruptcy. In my opinion, even today, only a badly advised and managed bank would make a loan backed only or mainly by real property in Anguilla.

Full disclosure, I was a founding member and the first legal adviser of National Bank of Anguilla from its formation in 1985 when I signed the Memorandum and Articles of Incorporation which I had drafted. I remained legal adviser until about 1995 when my law partner took over primary responsibility for that client. After I retired and we wound up the partnership in 1999, another law firm was retained as its adviser.

Edmund Lawrence was the bank’s banking advisor in the early days of the late 1980s. He admonished the directors, that it was unsafe to make a loan based mainly or entirely on Anguillian real property security. I recall he provided them with a policy paper to that effect. I now regret that during the time I was the bank’s legal adviser in the 1980s and 1990s, I did not repeatedly remind the directors of his advice. They appear to have entirely forgotten his warning by the time the central bank moved in.

By 2013, so many of the bank’s loans were in default that the Central Bank sent in the conservators, and it was effectively shut down and ceased to function. Indeed, up until the year 2013 I was unaware that nearly 50% of the bank’s loans were in default. At that time, the NBA claimed to hold assets and obligations of over a billion EC dollars. The directors lent out almost all the money deposited with the bank, or some EC$500 million of which some 49% was in default at the time it ceased to operate. At that time, the bank was worth a billion dollars on paper. My late mother and I owned 10% of the equity in the bank. Would somebody remind me what 10% of a billion is? Of course, the shares are now entirely worthless.

We do not know the details of the bank’s default at the time the central bank closed it down. The then Chief Minister, in resisting public demands for the forensic report on the bank to be published, explained on the radio that if he were to do so his main critics would be embarrassed. All Anguillians would learn that they were among the five elite families who were principally responsible for the bank’s failure. The directors awarded them huge loans secured only by land. They should have been aware the securities would never sell, and the loans could never be paid back.

An effective central bank would not tolerate a bank with bad loans of more than 5%, far less approaching 50%. That would be a breach of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision’s Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision, issued in September 2012. Due to the absence of appropriate legislation in Anguilla the ECCB was unable to effectively supervise the NBA. As a result, the central bank was unable to rein in the directors of NBA prior to the take-over in 2013. That default was only remedied by a raft of new laws in 2015.

These Core Principles are the minimum standards applied to judge how sound are the prudential regulation and supervision of banks and banking systems in all the regions of the world. They are the benchmark used by the IMF and the World Bank for testing the quality of supervisory banking systems. There have been core principles for many decades. The 2012 version is merely the latest version.

The principal reason why land and houses in Anguilla are a bad security for a loan is that real estate is, by law and for all practical purposes, almost unsellable by a lender for its full market value. If distressed land is successfully sold at auction in Anguilla today, it is probably only because the auctioneer is taking the risk of being sued for not following the rules. Any purchaser of real estate at auction in Anguilla today risks having his purchase declared fraudulent and invalid. He succeeds only because Anguillian borrowers are reluctant to defend their interests, relying instead on the illiterate and superstitious victim of injustice’s frequently heard refrain when failing to seek legal redress, “I leaving he to God, I leaving he to God.”

By the Registered Land Act, a chargee (usually the lender) does not hold title to the land security, but only holds a “charge” over it. Common law mortgages have been abolished in Anguilla. A mortgage was a transfer of title to the lender, with the borrower holding a right to have the land transferred back to him after he paid off the loan. With a land mortgage, the lender could relatively easily foreclose on mortgaged property and sell it either privately or by auction. By contrast, a charge in Anguilla operates as a security only, and the lender obtains no title or right to foreclose on the borrower’s property.

In Anguilla, when the lender exercises his right of sale of a land security in the case of a default by the borrower, he is obliged by the statute to act in good faith and have regard to the interests of the chargor/borrower. This means that he must properly advertise the property to ensure that the best possible market price is obtained at the auction sale.

If a borrower challenges in court a successful auction, the bank must be able to show that it honestly attempted to obtain the true market value of the property. It cannot value it at a lower price or, even worse, as I observe from the newspaper advertisements it seems to be done today, advertise its auction with a very low reserve price, presumably merely the amount it is owed. If that occurred and the auction was challenged, such a sale would likely be held to be illegal and liable to be overturned by a court.

An additional restriction on the lender’s right to sell is that the statute does not allow it to engage in a private sale agreement with a purchaser, as he could under a mortgage. The sale must be by public auction only, by a competent auctioneer, and with the reserve price set at the true amount of the market value, unless a judge orders the amount to be reduced. I have known would-be purchasers privately offer a bank to purchase a distressed property, with the bank having to refuse the offer. The purchaser then attends the subsequent auction and wins the bid at half the price he offered privately. This was the case with Flag Luxury Properties a few years ago.

In Anguilla there was, when I practised law, no requirement for auctioneers to be professionally qualified. Nor was there any institute providing a qualification for licensing qualified land valuers. Local land valuers were then, and probably still are, unqualified and unregulated.

It was only in 2017 that the ECCB first published valuation prudential standards for licensed financial institutions under the Banking Act. It insisted that member banks of the currency region must use the services of qualified valuers such as members of the London-based Royal Institute of Chartered Surveyors (RICS). Yet, so far as I am aware, there is no RICS valuer providing services in Anguilla. There does not appear to be any regional institute of similar reputation acceptable to the ECCB.

In my experience, our local “valuers” put up a good show, producing magnificent and expensive reports for their clients’ use. The reality is that they are generally unqualified, unlicensed, unregulated, and susceptible to pressure from their client to set either a higher or a lower price, depending on who they represent, and how ethical they are.

Any successful auction of charged property in Anguilla is liable to challenge if it is alleged that the bank is not obeying its statutory duty to the borrower. A sale of charged property by a bank can be stopped by a court order if the bank is unable to prove that it satisfied its obligations towards the owner/borrower.

The Virgin Islands have the same Registered Land Act as Anguilla. See the 2012 judgment of the Court of Appeal in the Tortola case of Hilda Elizabeth Stoutt v First Bank of Puerto Rico [HCVAP 2010/0016]. In that case, the consequence of an attempt to sell was that the court declared that the bank’s claim against an elderly widow, who had been unduly influenced by her son to use her land and house to secure his commercial borrowing, was unenforceable. Applying the principles of undue influence to the bank in this case, the court held that the bank was fixed with constructive knowledge of the existence of undue influence exercised over Mrs. Stoutt in her offering up her property as security for her son’s company’s indebtedness to the bank. The bank’s manager was the elderly widow’s relative and knew that she had no interest in her son’s business. As a result, the court deprived the bank of its right to sell her property that she had put up to secure his borrowing.

The ECCB is under an international obligation to implement the Basel Core Principles in our region. It is required to ensure that the regulatory framework, that is, the standards it demands of the banks it regulates, meet the minimum standards established by the Core Principles. Prior to the passage of the 2015 Banking Act, it failed to do so, and risked being categorised as a sub-standard central bank.

The 2015 Banking Act of Anguilla, like most modern Banking Acts, is based on the Core Principles. There are 29 Core Principles. They are divided into two areas. Principles 1-13 deal with the supervisory powers, responsibilities, and functions of central banks. Principles 14-29 deal with the expectations made of banks, emphasising the importance of good corporate governance, risk management, and compliance with supervisory standards.

Any international investor who does business in Anguilla knows that our professional standards are lax. Generally, the only professions and trades that are legally regulated are food handlers, liquor licence retailers, land surveyors, physicians and nurses, lawyers, accountants, and auditors. All other professions, so far as I am aware, operate on a caveat emptor basis. Anyone may with impunity call himself an architect, engineer, land valuer, real estate agent, auctioneer, or banker. None of these professions is by law in Anguilla subject to any form of professional licensing or regulation.

The Core Principles require that the legal system ensures that banks can unobstructedly exercise their rights over real estate put up as security for a loan in the case of a loan in default. Anguilla fails this test. In practice in Anguilla, a foreign purchaser of charged property sold at auction, must apply for, and be granted, a First World War era Aliens Landholding Licence.

This requirement places an insurmountable barrier in the way of a bank selling the property of a politically well-connected borrower. That obstacle was meant to be overcome by the creation of the Eastern Caribbean Asset Management Company (ECAMC), which would purchase the loan in default and sell the charged property free of the obstruction that binds the hands of the bank.

The law was passed by the House of Assembly in Anguilla since 2015, but as with most politically risky laws, has been in hibernation since the day it was enacted. So far as I am aware, the government has succumbed to public pressure not to allow this company to operate in Anguilla. Anguillians object to their lands that they put up to secure a bank loan being sold when they default.

Since we in Anguilla do not seem capable of or interested in correcting our professional and ethical deficiencies, it is hardly surprising that external agencies will force internationally recognised standards on us. If they don’t, then our banks will continue to fail. I fear that may include the National Commercial Bank of Anguilla Ltd.

Sunday, May 15, 2016

ECCB Agreement Amendment

The ECCB (Amendment of Schedule) Order, 2016
[1]     Prior to the invention of our EC dollar in 1965, and since 1935, the name of our currency was the “BWI dollar”.  Then, our islands entered into the Eastern Caribbean Currency Agreement.  This established the Eastern Caribbean Currency Authority (ECCA), with headquarters in Barbados.  ECCA was authorised to issue the new EC dollar.  Barbados withdrew from the Currency Union in 1972.  Our governments decided to move ECCA’s headquarters to St Kitts.  Gradually, most of our countries became independent.  The name BWI dollar seemed obsolete.  The name was changed to the “EC dollar”.
The Agreement
[2]     In 1981, the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (the OECS) came into existence with the signing of the Treaty of Basseterre in St Kitts.  The following year, 1982, in Trinidad, most of our OECS governments[1] signed the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank Agreement (the ECCB Agreement) bringing an end to the old ECCA.  The ECCB Agreement established the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank (the ECCB) with its headquarters in St Kitts.  Anguilla signed up and became a full member in 1987.
The Act
[3]     As every High School CAPE Law student knows, a treaty is not a law.  A treaty may be a source of a law.  A treaty or convention is an agreement which may be binding on governments among themselves, but it does not affect you or me.  To make it a part of the law of the country, an Act of parliament to that effect must be passed by the local legislature.
[4]     In 1983, though Anguilla was not yet a full member of the Currency Union, our House of Assembly passed the ECCB Agreement Act, 1983.[2]   This enactment made the ECCB Agreement a part of our law. The Act is a very short one.  It consists of just 6 brief sections.  The bulk of the Act is taken up by the ECCB Agreement.  This is set out as a Schedule to the Act.  Section 2 of the Act provides that the Agreement is to have the force of law in Anguilla.
[5]     There is provision in the Agreement and in the Act for the members of the Currency Union to amend the Agreement.  Section 4 of the Act lays down the procedure to be followed.  The section says that, once the Agreement is amended by the governments, the Governor must bring the amendment into law in Anguilla by signing an Order published in the Official Gazette.  As the Constitution provides,[3] once the Executive Council (Anguilla’s Cabinet) agrees to take a step, and the Governor is named in the relevant law as the official who must sign, then the Governor must sign it for and on behalf of the Government of Anguilla.  It is the act of the government, not a personal act of the Governor.
[6]     The senior policy making body of the ECCB consists of the Monetary Council.  This is made up of the eight Ministers of Finance of the participating governments.[4]  Given this management structure, there is always a risk of paralysis.  An action that the ECCB might propose for the benefit of one member might be vetoed by another member.  In late 2007, our sub-region was seriously affected by the world-wide banking crisis.  The ECCB found itself powerless to intervene in the banking crisis in the way a central bank is expected.  It soon became apparent that the ECCB was ineffective in acting as a lender of last resort for any member country that might get into difficulty.  Change in our system of banking supervision was desperately needed.  The Central Bank sought advice from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund on the reforms that had to be made.
[7]     In 2012 the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision issued new Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision.  These Core Principles are the minimum standards by which the prudential regulation and supervision of banks and banking systems around the world are judged.  There are in all 29 Core Principles[5] for effective banking supervision.[6]
[8]     The first of them is that there must be a suitable legal framework for banking supervision.  A properly established Central Bank must be empowered to license banks, conduct ongoing supervision, address compliance with laws, and take timely corrective action to address safety and soundness concerns.  At the time of the financial crisis, the local Ministers of Finance were the licensing authority for banks of the sub-region, not the Central Bank.  Our Central Bank, the ECCB, failed the first of the Core Principles.
[9]     The second Core Principle covers the independence and legal protection required for all Central Banks.  For a Central Bank to be recognised as effective, it must possess independence and autonomy.  Local law must provide protection for the Central Bank and its staff against lawsuits for actions taken while discharging their duties.  No person should be permitted to bring a lawsuit which can block a Central Bank in carrying out its banking supervision.
[10]   That does not mean that the Central Bank is immune from liability.  If a citizen is harmed as a result of any wrongful action taken by the Central Bank, he may still file a lawsuit.  If he has suffered loss, he will be entitled to be paid damages or compensation.  But he cannot get an injunction that will stop the Central Bank from carrying out its supervisory functions.  It was evident to the international banking community that our Central Bank had no such powers or protection under the existing Agreement and local legislation.  Our Central Bank failed the second of the Core Principles.  The ECCB simply did not meet the basic standards expected of a Central Bank.
[11]   The Monetary Council received and considered a number of reports[7] and recommendations from consultants.  These were hired to advise on steps needed to upgrade the ECCB.  It was imperative the ECCB should pass the Basel Committee’s tests for effective banking supervision.  Finally, the Monetary Council agreed to a number of reforms.
[12]   In sum, our governments agreed to take eleven steps to bring our Currency Union up to international standards.[8]  Among the first of the reforms agreed was the need to amend the ECCB Agreement to give the Central Bank the power to intervene and take necessary action to prevent the collapse of a failing bank and to restructure its business and capital base.  Other steps included replacement of the outdated Banking Act with a modern Banking Act to reflect the new banking regime.  The new Banking Act was passed by our House of Assembly and became law with the Governor’s assent on 18 April 2016.
The Amended Agreement
[13]   At its 81st meeting on 24 February 2015, the Monetary Council agreed that legislative and regulatory reforms were needed to protect the ECCU banking sector.  Then-Chief Minister, Hubert Hughes, signed up to the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank Agreement (Amendment), 2015 on behalf of Anguilla.  This amendment to the Agreement would not become part of our law until an Order was signed by the Governor incorporating it into our law as provided in the ECCB Agreement Act.[9]
The Amendment Order
[14]   On 22 April 2016, Anguilla’s Governor duly signed the ECCB Agreement (Amendment of Schedule) Order, 2016.[10]  By this legislative act, the Governor, as authorised both by our House of Assembly in the provision of section 4 of the ECCB Agreement Act, and by the Executive Council led by Chief Minister Victor Banks, duly brought into law the Amended Agreement signed the year before by Chief Minister Hughes.[11]
Conclusion
[15]   Anguillians should be proud that we have finally, if belatedly, shown ourselves to be supportive of the new regulatory standards which the international banking community expects of our banking sector.  We were previously viewed as wild-west bankers, not subject to proper regulation by an enabled Central Bank.  We cannot be viewed in this light any longer.  We now conform to international standards.  Our banking sector can stand equal with the rest of the world.


[1]      Not Anguilla, whose membership was still vetoed by the St Kitts Government.
[2]      Revised Statutes of Anguilla, c E5.
[3]      Section 28 of the Anguilla Constitution Order, 1982.
[4]      The current members of the Monetary Council are described here: http://www.eccb-centralbank.org/About/monetary.asp
[5]      Previously 25 in number.
[6]      Which I have previously detailed in an article you can read at: http://donmitchellcbeqc.blogspot.com/search/label/Core%20Principles
[7]      Copies of which are available to read on the ECCB website: http://www.eccb-centralbank.org/
[8]      I have described these 11 essential steps in an article on my website which you can read here: http://donmitchellcbeqc.blogspot.com/2015/11/banking-reform-in-anguilla-2015.html
[9]      The Hubert Hughes administration published the Amendment to the Agreement in February 2015 before the general elections which brought the Victor Banks administration to power.  It can be seen on the Government of Anguilla website here: http://www.gov.ai/documents/ag/ECCBLIB-678364-v1-ECCB_Agreement_Amendment_2015_-_Final_Version.pdf
[10]   Local Statutory Instrument No 20/2016.
[11]   What is not clear is what motivated then-Chief Minister Hubert Hughes to attempt to pass the very same amendment to the Agreement into law on 25 October 2013 using the incorrect procedure of rushing an Amendment Act through the House of Assembly with all three readings taking place on the same day in the absence of the three Opposition members and the Ex-officio members of the House.  No one in Anguilla seems to know if the Governor ever contributed to the debacle by assenting to the Act.  The story is related in The Anguillian Newspaper here: http://theanguillian.com/2013/11/opposition-asks-governor-not-to-sign-acts-says-house-sat-without-a-quorum/  The level of incompetence demonstrated by the then Attorney-General’s chambers in drafting and approving this law and procedure is nothing short of astonishing.