Showing posts with label Legal history. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Legal history. Show all posts

Friday, May 12, 2017

Anguilla's Judicial System, 1650-2017

The Lawless Period
Anguilla was first settled by runaway English indentured servants from Barbados and small farmers from St Kitts escaping the heavy tobacco taxes, imposed there to build the forts for defence against the French.  An English historian, writing in 1707, described the settlers of Anguilla this way,[1]
Their business . . . was to plant corn, and breed tame cattle,[2] for which purpose they brought stock with them.  They were poor and continue so to this day, being perhaps the laziest creatures in the world.  Some people have gone from Barbados, and the other English Charibbee Islands, thither;  and there they live like the first race of men, without government or religion, having no minister nor governor, no magistrates, no law, and no property worth keeping.  If a French author is to be believed, . . . ’The island is not thought worth the trouble of defending or cultivating it’.
What was patently unfair about this description of the early Anguillians was the accusation that the people were lazy.  From the earliest days, to be lazy in Anguilla was to die from starvation and want.  Regular periods of drought; frequent hurricanes; a thin, poor and unproductive soil; and the devastations brought by the wars between the English and the French combined to impoverish the people.  Only the keeping of small stock such as goats, and the growing of such tough crops as maize, sweet potatoes, and pigeon peas could ensure the survival of the people.  The risky enterprises of privateering during times of war, and the continuous smuggling among neighbouring islands, brought into the island a limited amount of coin.  No one could prosper, far less grow rich, in such adverse conditions.
In 1666, some sixteen years after settlement, the leading members of the isolated, ignored and impoverished Anguillian settlers formed themselves into a self-appointed Council and elected their own deputy governor.[3]  The power this Council exercised was not sanctioned by any local or regional statute or other law.  In every other Leeward Island, Royal Patents were sent out from London for the establishment of a deputy governor and an island Council.  In Anguilla by contrast, unique in the West Indies, for nearly 175 years after the island’s settlement in 1650, there was no lawfully constituted Council to govern the affairs of Anguilla.  The Anguilla Council was self-appointed and was merely tolerated by the colonial authorities in Antigua.  The Governor-in-Chief invariably confirmed the local appointee, and never interfered in the affairs of the Anguilla Council, as he frequently did in the more prosperous and consequential colonies of Antigua, St Kitts, Nevis, and Montserrat.  He touched on Anguillian affairs only when there was an appeal from a decision of the Anguilla Council, which he would pass on to the Secretary of State in London for a ruling, since he exercised very limited authority over the Anguilla Council.  The result was that, throughout this early period, the common Anguillian man and woman endured the unregulated government of their Council without the benefit of any real supervision by the colonial authorities.
In consequence, the official view for its first 175 years of the government of Anguilla, if colonial officials ever took the time to think of the government of Anguilla, was that the people were not governed by law.  In 1724, the Governor-in-Chief wrote[4] of the deputy governor of Anguilla, “If his cudgel happens to be one whit less than a sturdy subject's, then good night, Governor.”  Indeed, it was only in 1819 that the Governor-in-Chief in Antigua visited Anguilla and issued[5] formal patents to the deputy governor and the members of his Council.  This was the first and last time that Anguilla had a legally constituted government, until the British appointed an Anguilla Council under the Anguilla Administration Order of 1971.[6]
Not only was there no constitution or law under which a Council could be appointed in Anguilla.  There was no legislature in Anguilla or elsewhere to enact statutes under which the people could be governed.  Under the colonial regime of the day, no law enacted in any other colony could be extended to Anguilla.  The truth is that Anguilla was too poor, and of no consequence to the colonial authorities, since it contributed nothing to the Crown, to merit any expenditure of time or money on its administration.  The result was that up until the year 1825, the Anguilla Council, in effect, acted as the executive, legislative and judicial branches of the government of Anguilla, without any formal constitutional or statutory authority.[7]
On his one and only visit to the island in 1819, referred to earlier, newly installed Governor-in-Chief, Charles Maxwell, pointed out to deputy governor William Richardson and his Council the disadvantage of their existing without any form of legislature.  As the minute of his statement to them records, he said that,
It is much to be regretted as a British Colony, that this island should have been so long, and is, without a Legislative Body, constitutionally established, for the purpose of enacting good and wholesome laws for the good Government thereof;  that by reason of which the Registration of slaves, so urgently required by His Majesty’s Government, could not be effectually carried into execution, for the want of an Act of the island to coerce the enforcement of the same, the neglect of which may by its consequence, affect the dearest interest of the Colony in its most vital part, if delayed much longer.  The only remedy for obviating this defect would be for the inhabitants to Petition His Royal Highness, the Prince Regent, praying that he would be graciously pleased to grant them a Charter of Constitutions which, when prepared and sent to me, I shall transmit the same to His Royal Highness with a recommendation of it from myself.
However, the islanders did not succeed in submitting a draft Constitution for Anguilla, and attempts to provide a legislature for Anguilla were overtaken by certain events occurring in 1825.  The result was that none of the Leeward Islands laws passed for the registration of slaves and the amelioration of slavery were enacted for the benefit of the people of Anguilla.
The 1825 Absorption into St Kitts
In the year 1825, prolonged drought; regular hurricanes; and the long wars with the USA and France, which ended only in 1815, combined to bring the hitherto self-perpetuating Anguillian Council to its knees.  The British blockade of trade with the enemy during the preceding 30 years devastated the vital Anguillian privateering and smuggling industries, while the alternating periods of droughts and hurricanes destroyed the homes, small-stock and crops of the islanders.  The law suits in the island’s unofficial courts after 1780, traces of which have survived in the archives, demonstrate in a practical way just how the economy had collapsed.  For one thing, the sums being sued for declined from hundreds of pounds before the American Revolution of 1776 to just a few shillings and pence in the fifty years before Anguilla was joined to St Kitts.
Their economy having collapsed, the Anguillians submitted to pressure from London to be governed by St Kitts.  London’s main interest, as is evidenced in the correspondence of the Secretary of State with the Governor-in-Chief in Antigua in the early part of the 19th Century, was to have some form of law-making power in Anguilla that would apply law, particularly the slavery amelioration laws and the coming Abolition of Slavery Act, to the Anguillians.[8]
In that year, 1825, the St Kitts Legislative Assembly under pressure from London passed the Anguilla Act to provide for the Anguillians to elect one member to attend the St Kitts Legislative Assembly.[9]  From that year, laws made in St Kitts applied to Anguilla.  In this way, the Slavery Abolition Act of St Kitts in the year 1834 was effective to bring an end to slavery in Anguilla.  From 1825 Anguilla also began to share the judiciary of St Kitts.  The Chief Justice would visit Anguilla at intervals to conduct the civil and criminal court sitting.  All previous trials between 1650 and 1825 had been completely unauthorised by any enactment or other formal law or legal system.
The First Courthouse
The first official Courthouse on Anguilla appears to have been deputy governor Benjamin Gumbs’ house[10] on the top of Crocus Hill, turned over to public use after his death.  There is no surviving record of how this came to be.  The little complex of out-buildings around the main house served as the Customs House, Post Office and Police Station.  It was the administrative centre of the island, approached from South Hill and North Hill villages and the west via the public footpaths from North Hill, down into Katouche Valley and up the public path where the road leading to the Masara Resort now runs.  It was ideally located, as the port of entry of Crocus Bay was at the foot of the hill to the west, while the main town of The Valley lay immediately to the east.  When the Chief Justice visited Anguilla from St Kitts, the main building of the complex served to house the visiting court.  For at least the first 50 years after 1825, the visiting Chief Justices complain to the Secretary of State that, as there was no guest-house in Anguilla, they were forced to spend their nights on board ship in the harbour.  There was no point in his complaining to the authorities in St Kitts as the St Kitts Council had made it clear to the Secretary of State from the start that they would only accept responsibility for making laws for Anguilla on condition that not one penny for the island’s support was required from St Kitts.
After 1825, presiding at the sitting of the Court of Kings Bench to hear civil and criminal cases in Anguilla was Richard Williams Pickwood, CJ of St Kitts and Anguilla.  Sitting with him on the bench at the Courthouse were two Assistant Justices, who acted as assessors of the facts.[11]  A minute of their proceedings for several years is preserved in the records of the court held in the Archives in Basseterre, St Kitts.  Additionally, because Justice Pickwood was unusually liberal for his day, the detailed proceedings of some of his Anguilla trials have been preserved in the British National Archives.  This happened because the planters of St Kitts and Anguilla, who conspired to have him sanctioned by the Secretary of State and suspended as Chief Justice, prepared transcripts of some of those trials, together with affidavits commenting on them, and sent them to London as evidence of his unlawfully siding with the slaves against their owners.  These transcripts, and the complaints by the Anguillian planters against Justice Pickwood, provide revealing glimpses into social life in Anguilla in the first half of the 19th Century.
One was the 9 October 1832 trial of the island doctor and elected representative to the St Kitts-Anguilla Legislative Assembly for Anguilla, the Hon Benjamin Gumbs-Hodge, for the offence of assaulting the slave woman Charlotte and marooning her on Dog Island.  The indictment found by the Grand Jury was to the effect that,[12]
Benjamin Gumbs Hodge of the Road Division on the island aforesaid, Practitioner in Medicine, on the first day of March in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and twenty six with force and arms at the Road Division aforesaid in the island aforesaid, in and upon one Charlotte, a slave, in the peace of God and of our Lord the King then and there being did make an assault on her the said Charlotte did then and there beat, bruise and ill-treat and did then and there unlawfully, injuriously and against the will of the said Charlotte and without any legal warrant or authority in that behalf, seize, take and drag and forcibly carry the said Charlotte from the Road Division aforesaid in the island aforesaid across the sea to a certain place called Dog Island and her, the said Charlotte, in the said place called Dog Island did unlawfully and injuriously keep and detain against the will of the said Charlotte for a long space of time to wit, for the space of three weeks then next following, and other injuries to the said Charlotte then and there did to the damage of the said Charlotte and against the peace of our Lord the King.
The court records indicate that the witnesses bound over to give evidence were Charlotte Filipasso, Richard Roberts, and the Hon RW Pickwood himself.  Prosecuting was Charles Thompson, Attorney-General of St Kitts and Anguilla.  Mr Woodcock, a barrister of St Kitts appeared for the defence.
As the Accused was about to be arraigned, Mr Woodcock moved that he objected to the Chief Justice both sitting in judgment at the trial and being a witness at the trial.  The minute records that the Chief Justice explained that the law of criminal procedure at that time was that a trial that was not presided over by the Chief Justice was void.  Besides, he would not permit an accused person to select who he thought should be or not be his judge, as this would betray the important trust confided in the bench.  Also, he explained, the two Assistant Justices or assessors who sat with him had explained that they were completely incapable of conducting a criminal trial without his assistance, and if he recused himself they must do the same.
Mr Woodcock protested that he had recently seen a case in ‘Fortescue’s Reports’ which was clear authority for the proposition that a judge could not also be a witness in the case he was trying.  However, the Chief Justice was adamant that the procedure he proposed to follow was perfectly in order, and he dismissed the motion.
The accused was accordingly arraigned and the jury of Anguillian planters and dignitaries duly sworn to hear the evidence.  The witnesses proceeded to testify and be cross-examined, after which the jurors of Anguillian planters and merchants not surprisingly returned a verdict of not guilty.
The various affidavits sworn in the subsequent complaints to the Secretary of State against Chief Justice Pickering requesting his removal from the position of Chief Justice flesh out the details of this extraordinary incident.  It appears, reading between the lines, that in 1826 the Chief Justice was sailing his sloop from his estate on the north-west coast of St Kitts to hold one of the first Assizes in Anguilla under the new regime.  To arrive at the port of Road Bay, he had to sail past the small Anguillian Cay known as Dog Island.
The Honourable Peter Lake was then the owner of the Road Plantation and one of the leading citizens of Anguilla.  He appears to have been smitten by the beauty of his slave Charlotte.  He brazenly conducted an affair with her that soon came to the knowledge of his wife.  Mrs Lake, with the cunning of a woman scorned, hit upon a device to get rid of Charlotte.  She secretly cut up her own clothes and linen and torched them in her yard in the absence of her husband, falsely placing the blame on Charlotte.   At Charlotte’s subsequent trial for malicious damage, Mrs Lake gave false evidence to the Magistrates that she had observed Charlotte committing the act. 
Charlotte’s protestations of innocence could not prevail against her white accuser.  She was convicted of the arson, and sentenced to be marooned on Dog Island for a month, as punishment.  The Magistrates had given Dr Benjamin Gumbs-Hodge responsibility for carrying out the sentence.  Now, Dog Island was, and is, a tiny, barren Cay, with just a shed and a shallow well on it for the use of the shepherds placed there to keep an eye on the goats and other small stock that it was home to.  And then, as now, marooning was and always has been an illegal punishment, not sanctioned in any legal text.
As Chief Justice Pickering sailed past Dog Island on his way to Road Bay, whom should he spy but the beautiful Charlotte, illegally marooned on the Cay in punishment.  On his arrival in Crocus Bay, accompanied by Charlotte, he had the Attorney-General bring charges against the man who had forcibly placed her on Dog Island.
The records of the subsequent impeachment proceedings against the Chief Justice preserved in the Public Records Office at Kew Gardens reveal what happened next.  The Chief Justice could find no free Anguillian who would testify at the trial.  Blazing with fury, he did what no judge, hopefully, would do today.  He took off his wig from his head, slipped out of his judicial gown, stepped down from the bench upon which he sat with the two Assistant Justices, and entered into the witness box to testify.  When he had finished giving his eye-witness evidence, he put back on his wig and gown and resumed his seat.  As we know, the jury found in favour of their colleague and friend and dismissed the case.  But, Anguilla thereby became the first colony in the British Empire that I am aware of where the Chief Justice acted not only as judge but also as principal witness in the prosecution of an offender at the Assizes.
After 1825, Anguilla’s legal and judicial system evolved in tandem with that of St Kitts, and the colony was now officially titled “St Christopher and Anguilla.”  In 1882, when the Council and Assembly of Nevis were dissolved, and Nevis joined to create a three-island colony, it was, from then until 1967, officially known as the “Colony of St Christopher and Nevis”.  The name of Anguilla was dropped.  So, for example, Anguillian car licence plates prior to the Anguilla Revolution of 1967 began with the prefix “CN”, standing for St Christopher and Nevis.  After the Revolution, one of the first actions of Ronald Webster’s Peacekeeping Committee was to replace the licence plate letters “CN” with the letter “A” for Anguilla.
The old Courthouse with its out-buildings stood from the mid-1700s, when it was first built, until 1 September 1950, when Hurricane Dog hit the island.  The hurricane completely destroyed the wooden structure, leaving only the stone foundations remaining.  The masonry basement, including the cellar which served as the prison cell while court was in session, can still be seen there.  The ruins are overshadowed by two large, ugly, black Rubbermaid water storage tanks and two equally large and ugly radio aerials raised in the Courthouse yard.  Goats, mimosa trees and strangler fig compete to see which can be first to totally destroy the abandoned remains.
With the passing of the Slavery Abolition Act of 1834, Special Magistrates appointed by St Kitts were stationed in Anguilla to oversee the Apprenticeship Period, 1834-1838.  After 1838, and until 1882, the Magistrates of Anguilla were usually professional lawyers who were appointed as Stipendiary Magistrates, meaning they got paid.  The first on record was Thomas Egar (who served 1835-1841).[13]  He was followed by other qualified lawyers who doubled as the St Kitts-appointed local administrator for Anguilla.  The most famous and long-lasting was Robert William Pickwood (1842-1862), Chief Justice Pickwood’s son.  He was so dedicated to Anguilla and so well-respected that, when he died in St Martin, the funeral that the French gave him was described in the official correspondence as almost a state funeral.
Sometimes, disreputable St Kitts civil servants were dispatched to Anguilla to serve as Magistrate and President of the Vestry, mainly it seems, to get them out of the way of the St Kitts administration.  One such was George Alsbury (1863-1864), the roguish clerk to the Basseterre Magistrates Court and public printer of Basseterre.  He was first appointed as the customs officer of Anguilla and then later as Magistrate.[14]  We do not know for certain what his alleged offences were, but as he was a customs officer, it is not difficult to guess.
From 1882, the Magistrate of Anguilla was replaced by an administrator from St Kitts, called the Warden, whose duties included sitting as Magistrate.  These St Kitts administrators were often the physician, primarily assigned to look after the health of the islanders.  Vincent F Byron, late father of the President of the CCJ, the Rt Hon Sir Dennis Byron, was the last Warden sent to Anguilla, and he left the island with the outbreak of the 1967 Revolution.
Wallace Rey’s Courthouse
It was only in the year 1964, under Mr Byron’s administration, that the St Kitts government replaced the old, destroyed Courthouse, lost fourteen years previously.  Local Anguillian builder, Wallace Rey, was appointed to head Anguilla’s public works after he retired from the US Air Force Base in Antigua where he had found employment at the start of World War II.  Wallace Rey designed and built the new court building.  Its magnificent, reinforced-concrete transverse arches that reach up from the foundations and go up and over the roof to descend on the other side made it one of the most imposing structures at the time on the island.  Its design reflects that of St Mary’s Anglican Church, which he also designed and built around the same time.
In the intervening years 1950-1964, after Hurricane Dog destroyed Governor Benjamin Gumbs’ old building, temporary quarters in a private home now replaced with a modern concrete structure occupied by NAGICO across from the High School, served as the courthouse.  Wallace Rey’s 1964 building functioned at first only as the courthouse.  Later, it was to become the home of the Anguilla House of Assembly, the Court of Appeal, the High Court, the Magistrates Court, and the Juvenile Court.  These all shared the one-room premises without difficulty since when the Court of Appeal visited no other court sat.  When the High Court sat, there was no Magistrate’s Court, as the Magistrate doubled as Registrar of the Supreme Court.  This was the system in place which I met when I was appointed Magistrate of Anguilla in August 1976.  At that time and for the next several years, the only lawyers in the public service were the Attorney-General and the Magistrate.  As for Wallace Rey’s building in which I served as Magistrate and Registrar, it is no longer a court house.  It presently serves as the offices of the Statistics Department.
The short-lived West Indies Federation broke up in 1961 when Jamaica chose to go into independence rather than stay tied to the smaller islands.  Trinidad and Barbados left shortly after, and the Federation was dissolved.  By the year 1967, the individual colonies of the Leeward and Windward Islands were themselves headed to independence.  They first entered into the intermediate status of ‘Associated Statehoodship’ with Great Britain.  The old, separate Supreme Courts of the Leeward Islands and that of the Windward Islands, re-established after the collapse of the Federation in 1961, were merged into the new ‘West Indies Associated States Supreme Court’.
The West Indies Associated States Supreme Court was established by the Courts Order of 1967.  This court had a short life-span in Anguilla.  Almost immediately, Anguilla was in rebellion against its continued enforced union with St Kitts and Nevis.  The Anguillians refused to be made ready for independence, tied permanently to St Kitts and Nevis.  The Anguilla Revolution of 1967 was to be the first successful armed revolt in the British West Indies.[15]  The thirteen members of the St Kitts police force manning the Valley Police Station were packed onto a LIAT airplane and shipped back to Basseterre.  The visiting St Kitts judge was jeered out of his courthouse and chased down the runway until he boarded a waiting flight to take him back to St Kitts.  In 1967, the revolutionary Anguilla Peacekeeping Committee appointed the social welfare officer, Raphael Lake, to be Magistrate and he functioned in that office until he was replaced by the British administration after their invasion of the island in 1969 at the invitation of the St Kitts government.
In 1971, the British Parliament passed the Anguilla Act, which permitted Britain to separately administer the Anguillian part of the ‘Associated State of St Kitts, Nevis and Anguilla’ while they attempted to negotiate a settlement between the administrations in Basseterre and The Valley.  Between 1971 and 1982, Britain selected and paid for a Magistrate, a High Court Judge, and three Judges of the Court of Appeal.  By agreement with the governments of St Kitts and Anguilla, these appointments were rubber stamped by the Judicial and Legal Services Commission of the West Indies Associated States Supreme Court.  Appeals from the Court of Appeal of Anguilla lay to the Privy Council.  At least one appeal, that involving the Junks Hole Estate dispute, went all the way to the Privy Council in the years before Anguilla re-joined the West Indian judicial family.
In 1980, the People’s Action Movement party gained power in St Kitts by defeating the Labour Party in general elections.  The administration of the new St Kitts-Nevis premier, Dr Kennedy Simmons, negotiated with Britain for independence.  The British agreed, on condition that St Kitts let Anguilla go on its own.  St Kitts-Nevis agreed, and Anguilla was brought under full colonial rule by the Anguilla Act 1980 of the UK Parliament.
By the year 1982, the West Indies Associated States Supreme Court came to be known as the ‘Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court’ (the ECSC).  This name-change was made to give recognition to the demise of the Associated States, and their replacement by independent Commonwealth Caribbean Countries throughout the region.  The Robert Bradshaw regime had previously vetoed Anguilla’s participation in any regional institutions, including the Court.  The new St Kitts government of Dr Kennedy Simmonds relented, and Anguilla began to join the various regional bodies.  In 1982, the Anguilla Assembly passed the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court (Anguilla) Act, and Anguilla re-entered the fold of the regional judiciary.  From that time, the Magistrates of Anguilla have been appointed by the governor after consultation with the Judicial and Legal Services Commission.
Monica Joseph of Grenada (1982-1983) was our first regionally appointed High Court Judge.  She visited Anguilla from time to time from St Kitts to do the occasional criminal case or civil case that awaited the attention of a High Court Judge.  Her jurisdiction was somewhat reduced, since most felonies and misdemeanours had previously in the year 1978 been made triable summarily by the Magistrate, due precisely to the lack of a resident judge.  To this day, the Anguilla Magistrate’s Court has one of the most extensive jurisdictions in the Leeward Islands both civilly and criminally.  Justice Joseph was always pleased when she was presented with a pair of white gloves at the opening of the Criminal Assizes, as an indication that there were no criminal cases on the list to be dealt with.  That ceremony, unfortunately, did not persist for long.
Dame Monica Joseph, as she now is, was succeeded by a number of judges, including John Roberts QC of Sierra Leone and London; Sylvia Bertrand of Dominica and the BVI; Lloyd Williams of Jamaica and St Kitts (1991); and Neville Smith of the Bahamas and St Kitts (ca1992-1996), all of whom visited Anguilla occasionally from their assigned jurisdiction.
Adrian Saunders of St Vincent (1996-2000), subsequently of the Court of Appeal and later of the Caribbean Court of Justice, was the first ECSC High Court judge who actually lived in Anguilla.  He was followed by Ola Mae Edwards of Jamaica (2002-2003), subsequently Justice of the Court of Appeal; Janice George-Creque, later Pereira, of Virgin Gorda (2003-1009), subsequently a Justice of Appeal and later Chief Justice of the ECSC; Louise Blenman of Guyana (2009-2012), subsequently a Justice of Appeal; and, now, Cheryl Mathurin of St Lucia (2013 – present).
The New Courthouse
By the late 1990s, a dramatic increase in judicial activity in Anguilla meant that Wallace Rey’s old courthouse was no longer adequate to serve as a multi-purpose building.  The tourism industry had fuelled an enormous growth in the economy, and crime and litigation had mushroomed.  With British financial assistance, a new building was constructed at the eastern end of the government secretariat, adjacent to the former National Bank of Anguilla.  The plans were drawn by architect David Kenworthy and approved by a Committee of the bar and the Anguilla judiciary headed by Justice Adrian Saunders.  The new building now consists of three separate chambers.  They are the Magistrate’s Court, the High Court, and the House of Assembly.  This three rooms structure will serve Anguilla for the foreseeable future, but inevitably, in time, it will come to seem out-dated and in need of replacement.
Access to the laws of a country is essential for its good governance.  Not just lawyers need to know the law, everyone does.  The old saying, which we still apply to our citizens when they inadvertently breach a law, is that ignorance of the law is no excuse.  In most of the countries of the West Indies, all of the laws are available on a free government website online both to read and to download.  Anyone can go to the Government of Antigua and Barbuda website[16] and access any of the laws of that country.  Of course, if you desire to purchase the entire collection of the Laws of Antigua and Barbuda in book form, you will have to pay.  However, digital or soft copies of the laws are freely available to all.
This has not been so in Anguilla since the year 2000, when we published our new edition of the laws of Anguilla.  We are now prohibited from accessing the collected statutes that apply to us unless we pay several thousand EC dollars to purchase a set.  If I purchase a set of the laws from the A-G’s Chambers, I commit an offence if I share one of them with you on paper or by email.  According to the warning at the foot of each statute, I can be sued for breach of copyright.  If I do take a chance, and illegally share with you a digital copy of one of the laws of Anguilla, you will receive it in a format that is not searchable, and incapable of being printed.  I am informed that the only legal way to acquire a copy of an individual law of Anguilla is to purchase it for a minimum of US$25.00 from the A-G’s Chambers.
Even Government Departments are without access to the laws of Anguilla.  When, up to a year ago, I provided a legal aid clinic out of one of the Departments of Government, I enquired after one of the statutes I needed to advise a client on.  The response I got was that no one in the Department had access to the statute in question.  Since the Department was required to find the sum of US$1,500.00 to purchase a set of the laws, and could not afford the price, the Department had no copies of the laws of Anguilla.  I was given to understand that the same applies to many other Departments of the Anguilla public service.
The settlement of Anguilla, we have seen, started as a sanctuary for tax refugees.  Resistance to paying taxes is embedded deep in the culture of Anguilla.  To encourage us to pay our rates, or property tax, Government has found it necessary to introduce a 20% remission as a reward, if we pay our assessment at any time within the year it is due.  The culture of tax avoidance is so deeply ingrained, that we have established a financial services industry which provides services to the tax refugees of the world.
Among our first industries, we have seen, were those of smuggling and privateering.  Three hundred and fifty years later, the police seem ineffective in the face of growing imports of illegal drugs, guns and foreign sex workers.  The ancient industry of smuggling continues today, save that the illicit trafficking is in many times more dangerous commodities, and produces more pathetic victims.
Is it only me who sees the irony in the Anguillian authorities setting up a legal system that conceals the laws of Anguilla from her citizens, save for those who are very rich?  It seems anomalous that the authorities deliberately withhold our statutes from us.  The right thing is to make all our laws searchable online and printable without cost.  Payment should be demanded only for the paper and CD versions of the statutes.
We boast that Anguillians are intrepid entrepreneurs.  But, should we continue to permit our young men to start up “Sports Bars” for the exploitative employment of immigrant women on short-term “tourist visas”?  Illegal Santo Domingo lottery tickets are openly but illegally sold at every street corner shop or bar.  The “numbers” racket operates brazenly in several outlets in every village.  The police must know about all of this, but appear ineffective in shutting it down.
If this situation continues unchecked, the risk is that Anguilla will be known as a country of smugglers, human traffickers, and drugs dealers, a people who know no law.  So, what’s new about that, you may ask?
A speech prepared at the request of the Anguilla Bar Association Council for delivery at a special sitting of the Court in Anguilla at a ceremony to mark the 50th anniversary of the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court, but which was never delivered due to cancellation of the event.


[1]       John Oldmixon, The British Empire in America (1708), Vol 2, p.264.
[2]       The term ‘cattle’ at the time included pigs, sheep and goats.  It was probably this last which the settlers brought to the island.
[3]       Abraham Howell, Anguilla’s first deputy governor, in a patent preserved in the Anguilla Archives stored at the Court House, describes himself as having been elected as deputy governor in the year 1666.
[4]       CO.152/14: Governor-in-Chief John Hart to the Committee for Trade and Foreign Plantations.
[5]       Anguilla Council Minutes, 1819-1841, St Kitts Archives, photographed and transcribed by Martha Burrows and Heather Nielsen.
[6]       For some years after absorption by St Kitts in 1825, the St Kitts-Anguilla Legislative Assembly introduced a form of local government under the provisions of the Vestry Act, but its power was very limited.  Its meetings were chaired by the Magistrate.
[7]       Anguilla Council Minutes, 1819-1841, previously cited.
[8]       See for example the various correspondence and dispatches at CO.407/1 between Lord Bathurst and Governor-in-Chief Maxwell on the need for Anguilla to have laws.
[9]       CO.240/16, at folio 315: Act No 198. An Act to Authorise the Freeholders of the Island of Anguilla to Send a Representative to the House of Assembly in the Island of St Kitts (usually referred to as the “Anguilla Act”.
[10]     Its dimensions are so modest that one has difficulty referring to it as his ‘Estate Great House’.
[11]     CO.240/17, folio 1. The law which enabled this sitting was entitled, Act No 1: An Act for Establishing Courts and Settling Due Methods for the Administration of Justice in the Island of Anguilla.
[12]     Anguilla Court Records 1827-1845, located in the St Kitts Archives, Basseterre, photographed and transcribed by Martha Burrows and Heather Nielsen.
[13]     CO.239/67, Dispatch No 13: Mr McPhail to EG Stanley, Secretary of State for the Colonies
[14]     CO.239/111, Dispatch No 40/3473 of 5 March 1864: Governor Steven J Hill to Lord Newcastle.
[15]     Not emulated elsewhere in the British West Indies until the Grenada Revolution of 13 March 1979 brought Maurice Bishop’s New Jewel Party to power.
[16]     For the Antigua statutes, see; http://www.laws.gov.ag/acts/.

Thursday, March 15, 2007

40 Years of the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court - A Personal View

When I began my practice of law in the year 1971, the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court was a mere four years old:  a toddler.  Today, at age 40 years, it is fast approaching middle age.  What are some of the changes that have taken place during that time?  My talk tonight on this question will revolve around a very personal view of this history.  It will reflect my own interests and concerns.  I do not pretend that it will be a scholarly study of the really important developments that have taken place and of the changes that have occurred.
First, I must remind us of some of the background.  With the break-up of the West Indies Federation in 1962, the ‘Little 8’, as the Leeward and Windward Islands[1] were known, reverted for a few years to colonial status.  By the year 1967, Britain had agreed with them on an intermediate status:  not colonies, but not yet fully independent.   This was known as ‘Associated Status’.  Each island became an Associated State.[2]  Her Majesty was pleased, following the Indian precedent, to confer upon us written Constitutions.  Enshrined in these constitutions was our Bill of Rights, or a recitation of our Fundamental Rights.  Associated Status was not to last long.  Independence soon followed for 6 of the larger island colonies.  Grenada was the first to go into independence in 1974.  Closely following was Dominica in 1978, St Lucia and St Vincent and the Grenadines in 1979, Antigua-Barbuda in 1981, and St Kitts-Nevis in 1983.  Today, even the 3 remaining British Overseas Territories of Montserrat, Anguilla and the Virgin Islands[3] enjoy written Constitutions.  Members of the public and the media, not to forget to mention lawyers and judges, are now grown up in an understanding of what it means to be governed by a written Constitution.  It has not been a steady passage over those 40 years.
The Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court, as we now know it, began life in the year 1967 as the West Indies Associated States Supreme Court.[4]  Its predecessors were the Court of Appeal of the Windward Islands and Leeward Islands[5] and the Supreme Court of the Windward Islands and Leeward Islands.[6]  The Chief Justice of this earlier Court of Appeal was assisted by two puisne judges from the High Court.  Magisterial appeals were heard by two judges, often both from the High Court.[7]  Only appeals from High Court decisions went to the full bench of three judges.
The first Chief Justice of the West Indies Associated States Supreme Court in 1967 was Allen M Lewis of St Lucia.[8]  He was now assisted by two appointed Justices of Appeal.  The first two were Justices Keith Gordon of St Lucia[9] and Percy Lewis of St Vincent.[10]  The first judges of the High Court were Elwyn St Bernard of Grenada, Allan Louisy of St Lucia, Eric Bishop of Barbados, Eardley Glasgow of St Vincent, and Neville Peterkin of St Lucia.[11]  I had the privilege of appearing before all of them at one time or another.  These judges are famous among lawyers over a certain age.  We remember them with affection.
We can get a feel for who the leading lawyers of the day were by looking at their names in the West Indian Reports.  These are our publications of judgments of the Court of Appeal, and occasionally of our High Courts.  The names of the lawyers who appear in each case are listed.  Among the prominent Antigua practitioners who have now passed away, we first find mention in 1959 of the late Claude Earle Francis,[12] Egbert Ewart Harney,[13] Wilfred E Jacobs,[14] and Cosmos OR Phillips;[15] J Rowan Henry first appears[16] in 1964; and Cecil E Hewlett in 1967.[17]  Among the old-timers of the Antigua bar who are still with us, Louis Lockhart first appears[18] in 1959, Sydney Christian in 1968,[19] and Bernice Lake in 1970.[20]  Ken Allen appears[21] for the first time in 1964, and John Kelsick in 1969.[22]  The last two both practice mainly in Montserrat.
When you look through the West Indian Reports you are struck by the fact that the Judges of both the High Court and of the Court of Appeal were from the beginning all West Indians.  In earlier years there used to be British colonial judges.  But, for many years now, our judges have been West Indians.
There is a story best told by Joseph Archibald about the last of the old colonial British judges,[23] who served in St Kitts.  The judge had a great fondness for his brandy.  He called it his medicine.  He was accustomed to have his Registrar take a small flask into court with him.  At intervals throughout the day, he would ask for a little of his ‘medicine’.  A particular murder trial went on into the night before the jury reached a verdict.  Frank Henville of St Kitts was prosecuting.  The judge had frequent sips of his ‘medicine’.  By the time the jury came back, he needed assistance from two police officers to get up to his bench.  The jury returned a verdict of Guilty of Murder.  The judge turned to the prosecutor and solemnly put on his black cap.  Then, he said,
Frank Henville, the jury has found you guilty of the most heinous crime of murder.  It is now my sad duty to pronounce the only sentence which this court can impose on you.
By this time, as you can imagine, Frank Henville was literally shaking in his boots.  I can tell this joke on him because he was my uncle.  The Registrar had to quickly signal the two officers to help the judge from his seat and carry him back to his Chambers.  He returned the following morning to impose the sentence on the right person.  He was the last of the old colonial English judges appointed to our courts.
The first two Constitutional cases to be reported from the Associated States are both found in Volume 10 of the West Indian Reports.  They are the applications of Pearnell Charles[24] and Dr William Herbert[25] for bail.  They both arose out of the State of Emergency imposed on 30 May during the Anguilla Revolution of 1967.  The Charles case was an application for a writ of habeas corpus.  He had been arrested under a section of the Emergency Powers Regulations 1967 which permitted the Governor[26] to detain him.  He applied for the issue of a writ of habeas corpus.  The High Court refused the application, holding that the 1967 Regulations were a law enacted by the legislature authorising the taking of such measures.  It went to the Court of Appeal.  The appeal raised the question of the validity of the detention order having regard to the fundamental right to personal liberty guaranteed by section 3[27] of the Constitution.  Allen Lewis CJ gave the principal judgment of the Court of Appeal.  He held that the Regulations offended against section 3 of the Constitution and, accordingly, the detention order in respect of the appellant was invalid and his detention unlawful.  The appeal was allowed,[28] and it was ordered that a writ of habeas corpus was to issue, that the applicant be forthwith discharged, and the respondents to pay his costs.[29]  In this case, while the High Court was willing to uphold a restrictive and anti-democratic law, the Court of Appeal was more generous in its interpretation of the Constitution.
An early example of the liberating effect of the court is to be found in both the High Court and the Court of Appeal decisions in the case of Marguerite Brisbane and her television set.[30]  In September 1967, St Kitts was still smarting under the emergency created by the Anguilla Revolution of May in that year.  The St Kitts government was concerned that TV sets might be used by its citizens to acquire information that was not in accordance with the permitted version of events that were being broadcast by the State controlled radio.  TV sets were required to be imported by licence, but none were being issued.[31]  Baggage and private effects were exempted.[32]  Mrs Brisbane, on a trip to Montserrat, acquired a TV set.  She brought it into St Kitts as her personal baggage.  It was confiscated as having been imported without a licence.  She appealed to the High Court for a ruling whether it was exempt as being her private baggage.  The Attorney-General argued that ‘baggage’ meant such articles of necessity or personal convenience as are usually carried by passengers for their personal use.  He submitted that a TV set could not be baggage and was, in fact, an item of furniture.  Justice Glasgow in a reserved judgment ruled that it was “baggage and private effects” and, accordingly, exempt.  The sole ground of appeal was “that the learned judge was wrong in law in finding that the TV set was part of Mrs Brisbane’s baggage.”  The Court of Appeal upheld Justice Glasgow’s decision.  The Chief Justice agreed that the TV set fell within the meaning of “baggage and personal effects”, and could accordingly be imported without a licence.
Other cases arising out of the Anguilla Revolution, and the resulting state of emergency in St Kitts, include the freedom of information and freedom of movement cases of Michael Powell and Warren Thomas.[33]  By this time, the High Court was beginning to flex its constitutional muscle in protecting the rights of citizens.  The muscle was in these early days but poorly developed, and the ball was frequently dropped.  This was a case where Justice Glasgow declared that a law which required police permission for all meetings and gathering of persons except for genuine religious assemblies was unconstitutional.  It was the beginning of many forensic contests between the two trial-greats of St Kitts of the time, Dr William V Herbert and Lee Llewellyn Moore.  Lee argued that as the charges had been brought the day before the Constitution came into effect, the Constitution did not apply to the defendants.  He also argued that the Constitution guaranteed the right to assemble freely, and that the impugned law only restrained the right to assemble freely in a public place.  The Constitution, he argued, did not guarantee the right to assemble freely in a public place, it only guaranteed the right to assemble freely.  Lee often took extremely authoritarian positions in his legal arguments.  More often than not, Billy’s more libertarian arguments won the day.  They did not entirely do so on this occasion.  Justice Glasgow decided that the impugned law did contravene the Constitution, but that did not affect the offences charged against the defendants as they were committed before the Constitution came into effect.  So, it was a Pyrrhic victory.  He partly won the case, but still lost his freedom.  Not a satisfactory outcome for anyone.
The Powell and Thomas case also demonstrates the extremely narrow attitude adopted by our judges at the time when it came to the types of legal authorities they would permit to be cited before them.  Then, our courts only recognised English cases, and, reluctantly at first, West Indian cases.  The report notes[34] that Lee Moore had to seek the court’s permission, which he received, before he could refer the court to the learning in a number of cases on the Constitution of India.[35]  Contrast that with today, when an attorney can refer the court to any learning that might help the court.
Our court has gone a long way from the situation revealed by the 1968 High Court decision in the case of Marie Dib of Dominica.[36]  Mrs Dib was the 73 year-old widow of Ayub Dib, who had been a Lebanese merchant of some substance in Roseau.  When he died in 1963, Mrs Dib was entitled under his will to certain properties and an interest in his business in Dominica.  She was illiterate.  She was only able to sign her name.  Mrs Dib gave Mr Karam a general power of attorney.  She handed over control of her financial affairs to him.  He collected rents.  He compromised law suits.  He put up her property for sale.  He got her to sign deeds transferring her property to him allegedly for cash.  In fact, no money was paid.  The following year, she sued for the recovery of her properties.  She claimed that she had signed the transfer documents under a mistake as to their nature.  She had understood that they related to the rental of the properties and the management of the business.  She claimed that Mr Karam had abused her confidence in him and had influenced her to sign documents that were injurious to her.  She claimed that he took an undue and unconscientious advantage of her.  He denied her allegations of fraud and of undue influence.  He claimed that the sale to him had been made on her proposal.  The documents had been read and explained to her by the solicitor who prepared them.  She had signed with full knowledge of their contents and as her voluntary act.  Quite amazingly, in my view, the High Court found that Mr Karam had taken no advantage of his position or of the confidence reposed in him, and that the transactions were entered into in perfect good faith and after full disclosure.  The Court of Appeal happily reversed the High Court.  Sir Allen Lewis and Keith Gordon JA delivered substantive judgments.  They agreed that the appeal must succeed, and the transfers would not be allowed to stand.  These were early days in the development of trust law in the ECSC.
The Ben Jones case[37] coming out of Grenada in 1968 was another example of the narrow and restricted way in which the High Courts of that early period exercised the jurisdiction given by our Constitutions to protect our freedoms.  In that case, Ben Jones was an unsuccessful candidate in general elections in Grenada.  He was appointed to the Senate by the Governor.  Successful members of our parliaments are notoriously reluctant to see candidates who have not succeeded entering parliament in whatever capacity.  There have been other similar cases in our region.  The members of the successful party objected to Jones’ nomination.  They were supported by the President of the Senate.  The President ruled that Mr Jones was not qualified to be sworn as a Senator.  Jones brought a case in the High Court.  Section 37 of the 1967 Grenada Constitution[38] gave the High Court jurisdiction to determine whether any person had been validly appointed a Senator.  The section said[39] that the legislature might provide for the powers, practice and procedure of the High Court in relation to any such application.  No such provision had been made by the legislature.  The legislature had not set out the powers, practice and procedure of the High Court. But, then, it had not constrained them either.  Section 103 is the section that grants the High Court the general power to give citizens the widest relief for breaches of the Constitution.  The wide powers of the court under this section expressly[40] did not apply to questions of appointment to the Senate under section 37.  Ben Jones came before the High Court seeking a declaration and various orders that would have compelled the President to swear him in.  The President’s counsel argued that the High Court’s ordinary powers and remedies did not apply.  The court was a special court established by the Constitution.  As such, it only had such powers as the legislature gave it.  As the legislature had not given the High Court any powers, it had none.  The High Court judge agreed.  He decided that the High Court’s ordinary powers and remedies did not apply as the court was a special court established by the Constitution and only had such powers as the legislature gave it.  But, as the legislature had not given the High Court any powers, it had none.  The court could only answer the question put to it.  Ben Jones had been validly appointed a Senator.  But, the court could not grant him any relief.  Respectfully, I do not agree with that interpretation.  I would hope that it would not be repeated today.  Section 103 does not give the High Court jurisdiction to hear section 37 questions.  It is section 37 that gives the jurisdiction.[41]  It sets out certain rules of practice and procedure.[42]  It then gives the legislature the power to regulate the powers, practice and procedure of the High Court.  It does not follow that until the legislature does so, the court is powerless.  The section does not say, nor in my view does it inevitably follow, that if the legislature fails to make provision then the Court has no power to grant relief.  In my view, this case is one of the early examples of the initial timidity of our courts in protecting the rights and freedoms of our citizens under the Constitution.
The test of constitutional validity of legislation and executive conduct was first crafted in 1973 by Percy Lewis CJ [Ag] in the Antigua Times[43] case.  He it was who first laid down that:
There is a presumption of constitutionality of impugned legislation, the viability of which must be weighed as follows:-
Once a prima facie case is made out by the applicant that the legislation or the executive conduct violates a fundamental right, then there is a burden on the State to show that the legislation or the executive policy or conduct comes within the permissible limits allowed by the Constitution, and that its enactment or implementation was reasonably required.
The doctrine of proportionality that he laid down in that case was temporarily set back by the decision of the Privy Council.  But, it has at last triumphed in the DeFreitas case,[44] the Antigua Observer case,[45] the John Benjamin case,[46] and Brown v Stott.[47]
We have had our share of judges who have taken shelter under silly technicalities in order to avoid possibly embarrassing the government.  We have come quite a long way since the days of the decision of our Court of Appeal in Tim Hector’s case.[48]  All Antiguans will remember that that case was one in which Hector and the Outlet Newspaper were charged with an offence of “printing of false statements likely to undermine public confidence in the conduct of public affairs”.  Justice Albert Matthew had declared that those words[49] were unconstitutional.  The Chief-Justice held that he was wrong, and his fellow Justices of Appeal agreed with him.  That reactionary decision was happily corrected by the Privy Council.[50]  Lord Bridge of Harwich in delivering the opinion of the Board said,[51]
In a free and democratic society it is almost too obvious to need stating that those who hold office in government and who are responsible for public administration must always be open to criticism.  Any attempt to stifle or fetter such criticism amounts to political censorship of the most insidious and objectionable kind.  At the same time it is no less obvious that the very purpose of criticism levelled at those who have the conduct of public affairs by their political opponents is to undermine public confidence in their stewardship and to persuade the electorate that the opponents would make a better job of it than those presently holding office.  In the light of these considerations their Lordships cannot help viewing a statutory provision which criminalises statements likely to undermine public confidence in the conduct of public affairs with the utmost suspicion.
Nor can we be proud of the 1990 St Vincent High Court decision in Egerton Richards’ case.[52]  There the judge threw out for mere technical breaches a very serious constitutional issue of great public importance.  It concerned whether the Governor had the right to appoint opposition senators when the government had won all the seats at an election.  We can be confident that our High Court Judges would today be very reluctant to shy away from coming to a decision in such an important matter.
The more recent decision of the Court of Appeal in Anguilla in John Benjamin’s case was undoubtedly a temporary setback to the progress that our courts have made.  Government had closed down a popular call-in programme on the island’s sole government-owned radio station, because of criticism on it of government action.  In the High Court, Adrian Saunders J [as he then was] had ruled that Government’s action was unconstitutional.  It was a contravention of the Applicants’ right to freedom of expression guaranteed and enshrined in the Constitution. He called it an arbitrary or capricious withdrawal of a platform which had been made available by the government.  The members of the Court of Appeal were persuaded to set aside his orders.  They rejected the argument that a radio station could be a public place where there was a right to express views.  They held that, on the contrary, it was "property which is not by tradition or designation a forum for public communication."  Fortunately, the Privy Council was able to restore Justice Saunders’ original decision.  They held that he had been entitled and right to find here that there had been a contravention of Mr Benjamin’s rights to freedom of speech and expression protected by the Constitution.
Undoubtedly, one of the High Court decisions that the court can feel proud about is the decision of Albert Redhead J in the Barbuda Council case.[53]  All Antiguans will be familiar with the case.  In 1992, Ephraim Georges J had granted an injunction against a sand mining company from taking sand from a beach in Barbuda.  The Minister of Agriculture in the Government of Antigua arranged with the officers of the sand mining company for the company’s trucks and bulldozers to be rented to the government.  The Minister hired the drivers, and the mining continued.  The trucks the Minister had rented from the sand mining company delivered the sand to the company at the barges drawn up on the beach.  The Barbuda Council applied to Justice Redhead in the High Court for the Minister and those involved in the continuing mining to be committed for contempt of court.  The Minister was completely unrepentant.  He argued that he did not have to obey the injunction as it had not been served on him personally.  He argued that Ministers of the Crown cannot be proceeded against for contempt of court, even if they give and break a personal undertaking to the court.  Justice Redhead rejected all the Minister’s excuses.  He held that once the Minister knew of the injunction and its terms, as the Minister did in this case, and once he aided and abetted the mining company in breaching the terms of the injunction, as he did in this case, he was guilty of contempt.  He found the Minister’s actions to be a gross interference with the order of the Court, a challenge to the independence of the court, and an affront to the rule of law.  He sentenced the Minister and the company officials to one month’s imprisonment.  It is no fault of the court, or of Antigua and Barbuda’s legal system, that the Governor General was persuaded by the government to grant a full pardon the same day.
There was a time, not so long ago, when judges all over the Commonwealth were universally held in high esteem.  And, they were comfortable with their status.  As Lord Hewart humorously put it to the guests assembled at the Lord Mayor’s banquet in London in 1936:[54]
His Majesty’s judges are satisfied with the almost universal admiration in which they are held.
Similarly, Lord Devlin suggested tongue in cheek in 1979 that:
The English judiciary is popularly treated as a national institution . . . and, like the navy, tends to be admired to excess.
Lord Donaldson, a former Master of the Rolls, ironically summed up the commonly held view of judges and accountability with this statement:
The essence of my job is that I am responsible to the law and to my conscience and to no one else.
This attitude extended to and was shared throughout the West Indies.  This has all changed over the years.  Our judiciary is now much more open to criticism.  Judges are no longer sacrosanct.  Especially since our judges have been asked to interpret the Constitution, and to rule on governmental action, there has been increased public attention to the work that judges do.  When an important case is tried, there is hardly a newspaper that does not carry a story on it.  The call-in radio programmes sometimes seethe with comment, pro and con.  In my view, this is a healthy development.  It reflects the changing role that the courts play in a modern society.  This has happened not only in our society.  John Mortimer, the English lawyer and writer wrote humorously,
Many years ago, when I first took up the law, proceedings in court were shrouded in myth.  In those days the country at large believed that trial invariably came to the right conclusion, that police officers told nothing but the truth, and that judges were miraculously conceived and were born unencumbered with the usual human luggage of preconceived ideas, knee-jerk reactions, prejudices, failures of the imagination, inability to admit mistakes, or pure bloody-mindedness.
These myths have now, no doubt to the regret of many members of the legal profession, gone the way of witchcraft and the Flat Earth Society.  Trials have, despite energetic whitewashing by appeal tribunals, been shown to have gone horribly wrong.  Police evidence is now taken by juries with large helpings of salt.  And the pronouncements of some judges, before and since retirement, have gone beyond endearing eccentricity to give some cause for alarm.
But, as the Rt Hon Beverley McLachlin, Chief Justice of Canada, put it,[55] if judges are more and more the subject of critical scrutiny, the truth is that the public has never held our judiciary in higher esteem.  This is proved by the fact that it turns to the judiciary more and more for the resolution of its problems.  It is not so much agreement with the court’s decisions, but a result of faith in the judicial process.  Our people appear to share a profound belief that when other institutions fail, one can count on the fairness of the courts.
Those of us who have been around the courts for many years have observed that the courts are going through change on several fronts.  Not so long ago, it was thought that it was the House of Assembly that made the law, and it was for the judge to apply it to the case, and that was the entire story.  It is now realised that it is not so simple.  From time immemorial, judges have interpreted and incrementally changed the law.  The judge is obliged to play the role of law-developer in resolving disputes fairly.  This role has now dramatically expanded.  Judges are now obliged, given the increasing scope of disputes that are brought before them, to develop the law in the domain of social policy.  The increasing awareness of human rights helps drives this process.  When our citizens bring issues of wrongful deprivation of property, liberty, or freedom of movement, before the court, then our judges, unqualified as they are, are forced to venture into the area of social policy.  When our legislatures are reluctant to deal with pressing social issues such as women’s rights and family property, then the courts are, whether they like it or not, obliged to resolve these issues.  Judges are called on to be ever more sensitive to a broad range of social concerns.  The ivory tower no longer suffices as the residence of choice for judges.  At the same time, the judge must strive for objectivity.  It requires both an act of imagination and an attitude of ‘active humility’.  Fortunately, we can be confident that our judges of the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court, both at first instance and in the Court of Appeal, are equal to the task.
A Speech delivered to the Judiciary and members of the Bar at the Multipurpose Cultural Centre, Perry Bay, Antigua, on Thursday 15 March 2007, in celebration of the 40th Anniversary of the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court.


[1]       The term Little 8 included Barbados, but not the Virgin Islands. The latter opted not to participate in the West Indies Federation, believing that its future lay in association with the USVI.
[2]       Well, not quite each island.  Anguilla and Nevis were dependencies of St Kitts, until Anguilla broke away in a bloodless armed revolution in 1967, while Barbuda was and remains a dependency of Antigua.
[3]       The Virgin Islands is the historically correct designation of Tortola, Virgin Gorda et al.  It is St Thomas, St Croix and St John that are the “United States Virgin Islands”.  The Virgin Islands with increasing frequency over the years began to be referred to as the “British Virgin Islands.”
[4]       By virtue of the West Indies Associated States Supreme Court Order, SI 1967 No 223.
[5]       Established by the Windward Islands and Leeward Islands (Courts) Order in Council, SI 1959 No 2197, which came into force on 1 January 1960.
[6]       The high court in Antigua and Barbuda was then described as the “Supreme Court of the Leeward Islands and Windward Islands (Antigua Circuit)”, for example.  See: Catherine Herbert v R (1959) 1 WIR, 470; and John Bramble v R (1959) 1 WIR, 473; and R v Maynes (1959) 1 WIR, 368.
[7]       See, for example, the decision in Watts v COP (1967) 10 WIR, 530 where the appeal was heard by AM Lewis CJ and St Bernard J; or Spencer v Superintendent of Police (1967) 10 WIR, 541, where the appeal was heard in the High Court of Antigua by Louisy J and Berridge J (Ag).
[8]       Knighted the following year, and officially styled to as Sir Allen Montgomery Lewis.  His biography and those of various other Chief Justices can be found on the ECSC website at http://www.eccourts.org/aboutecsc/history.html
[9]       These island origins I have inserted from memory, and one or more of them may be mistaken.  My apologies to any one who is offended by an error.
[10]     See the first reported judgment of the court in Lesmond v R (No 1), (1967) 10 WIR, 252, a murder appeal from St Lucia.
[11]     See the lists of the judges of the various courts in 1967 at page vi of 9 WIR.
[12]     Who first appears in Bramble v R (1959) 1 WIR, 473.
[13]     Who first appears in Joseph v R (1959) 1 WIR, 365.
[14]     Who first appears in the Joseph case supra.
[15]     Who first appears in the Joseph case supra.
[16]     Who first appears in Crown Attorney v Mercer (1964) 6 WIR, 354.
[17]     Who first appears in Babb v Half Moon Bay Ltd (1967) 12 WIR, 294.
[18]     Who first appears in Martin v Greenaway (1959) 3 WIR, 439.
[19]     In Margetson v A-G (1968) 12 WIR, 469.
[20]     Dame Bernice Lake QC, as she is now more correctly styled, first appears in the West Indian Reports in the case of Joseph v Lockhart (1970) 14 WIR, 444.
[21]     In Agard v Asst Sup of Police (1964) 7 WIR, 245.
[22]     In Wade v Chief of Police (1969) 14 WIR, 173.
[23]     Properly, Dr Joseph Archibald QC, of Tortola.
[24]     Charles v Phillips and Sealey (1967) 10 WIR, 423.
[25]     Herbert v Phillips and Sealey (1967) 10 WIR, 435.
[26]     Sir Fred A Phillips, the first respondent.
[27]     3(1). No person shall be deprived of his personal liberty save as may be authorised by law in any of the following cases . . .”
[28]     The decisions turned principally on whether the Leeward Islands (Emergency Powers) Order in Council 1959 was “a law enacted by the legislature”, and whether it was an “existing law” for the purposes of the transitional provisions of the Constitution. 
[29]     Charles F Henville QC, Crawford with him, appeared for the Charles, while Malcolm Butt QC of Trinidad, Frederick Kelsick, Jenner Armour and Earl Francis appeared for Dr William Herbert.  JS Archibald, Senior Crown Counsel, appeared for the respondents.
[30]     Reported as A-G of St Christopher Nevis Anguilla v Brisbane (1968) 11 WIR, 525.
[31]     By section 3 of the External Trade Ordinance.
[32]     By section 4.
[33]     Chief of Police v Powell and Thomas (1968) 12 WIR, 403. 
[34]     At page 410.
[35]     These included Keshavan Madhava Menon v The State of Bombay (5) (1951) reported at p.2 of Basu’s Cases on the Constitution of India, 1950-1951; and Chiranjut Lal Chowdhury v The Union of India and Others (6) reported at p.18.
[36]     Dib v Karam (1968) 11 WIR, 499.
[37]     Reported as Jones v Gibbs and Knight (The Attorney-General Intervening) (1968) 12 WIR, 311.
[38]     Grenada Constitution Order 1967 (SI 1967 No 227).
[39]     At section 37(5).
[40]     By section 37(7) which said, “Nothing in this section shall confer jurisdiction on the High Court to hear or determine any such question as is referred to in s.37 of this Constitution.”
[41]     In s.37(1) when it says, “The High Court shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine any question whether (a) any person has been validly appointed as a Senator; . . .”
[42]     For example at s.37(2) where it says that an application to the High Court “may be made by any person registered in a constituency as a voter in elections of members of the House of Representatives or by the Attorney General . . . and if it is made by a person other than the Attorney-General, the Attorney-General may intervene and may then appear or be represented in the proceedings.”
[43]     Antigua Times v A-G in the Court of Appeal, cited by Dame Bernice V Lake QC in her 2003 address: ‘Prioritizing Socio-Economic Issues and Democratization in the Caribbean’ which is to be found at: http://cavehill.uwi.edu/bnccde/antigua/conference/papers/lake.html;  and see her address to the Fifth Annual Caribbean Media Conference on ‘The Caribbean Court of Justice: Public Confidence and the Role of the Media’ which can be read at http://www.caribbeancourtofjustice.org/papersandarticles/ccj-lake.pdf.
[44]     DeFreitas v A-G, Civil Appeal 42 of 1997, Antigua and Barbuda. [Unreported]
[45]     Observer Publications Ltd v Matthew et al [2001] UKPC 11.
[46]     Benjamin and Others v Minister of Information [2001] UKPC, 8; [2001] 4 LRC, 272; [2001] 1 WIR, 1040.
[47]     Brown v Stott [2003] 1 AC, 681; [2001] 2 WLR, 817; [2001] 2 All ER, 97.
[48]     A-G v Tim Hector (1987) 40 WIR, 135.
[49]     Under the Public Order Act 1972 as amended by the Public Order Amendment Act 1976.
[50]     Hector v A-G (1990) 37 WIR, 216.
[51]     At p.219.
[52]     Richards v A-G, No 484/1989, St Vincent. [Unreported]
[53]     Barbuda Council v A-G et al, Suit No 456 of 1988, Antigua & Barbuda.  [Unreported decision of Redhead J on 10 September 1993]
[54]     The following quotations and observations are taken from the remarks of the Rt Hon Beverly McLachlin PC on Judicial Accountability, presented at the Law and Parliament Conference, Ottawa, November 2, 2006, and which can be found at http://www.scc-csc.gc.ca/aboutcourt/judges/speeches/Ju_Resp_e.asp
[55]     In her remarks at the Fourth Worldwide Common Law Judicial Conference on ‘The Role of Judges in Modern Society’, May 5, 2001 found at http://www.scc-csc.gc.ca/aboutcourt/judges/speeches/role-of-judges_e.asp