Showing posts with label Geddes Granger. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Geddes Granger. Show all posts

Thursday, September 21, 2017

Time Kendall Speech



I have been around for so long that I can remember the Mighty Sparrow when he was a teenager.  When he won his first Road March aged 18 with “Jean and Dinah” I was a 9-year old student.  When the West Indies Federation was formed I was a 12-year old.  And when it broke up I was 16 years old.
Geddes Granger was the 1970 leader of the Black Power Movement of Trinidad.  It is likely that to the day he died last year Makandal Daaga, as he preferred to be called, was unaware of how the government destroyed his Movement.  At the urging of the Eric Williams Administration the CIA sent in a black agent sporting a huge Afro hairstyle to infiltrate the Movement.  He led a Black Power mob in an invasion of the Cathedral of the Immaculate Conception in Port of Spain.  They smeared human excrement on the inside walls.  This was guaranteed to turn the mainly Roman Catholic, urban, black, middle-class citizenry resolutely against the Black Power Movement.  You will not be surprised to learn that this “black ops” strategy was so successful that the Movement entirely collapsed within weeks.  I heard the details of the story brought back to the family dinner table by my father from National Security Council meetings he attended.  He told the story and others like it many times over the years.
The politician Bhadase Maraj was the leader of the sugar workers’ trade union.  My father was the managing director of a large Trinidad sugar company.  They had to negotiate with each other over wage increases every year.  At the time I was naively shocked to learn that they secretly met together late at night to agree what would be the result of the coming negotiations.  The company and the labour leader agreed in advance when there would be a strike and what the outcome of the strike would be.  Mr Maraj was a very successful elected politician and labour leader over many years.
In addition to what as a boy I learned of the tricks and stratagems of our nations’ political leaders I have lived and worked as lawyer in two, and as a judge in all nine, of our OECS countries from Grenada in the south to Tortola in the north.  To this day I still enjoy reading the digital editions of one or more daily and weekly newspapers from most of our island countries.  A very few of them are occasionally brave enough to publish revelations of government misconduct.  As a result I feel I have some basis on which to comment on our system of governance.
Let us start by considering why the US Constitution, by contrast with ours, has been so successful over two centuries in providing corrections for their instances of bad government?  What did the mothers and fathers of our Commonwealth Caribbean Constitutions miss when our constitutional arrangements were being carved out of the mass of available precedents?
Between the Declaration of Independence of 1776 and the adoption of the US Constitution in 1787, and of the Bill of Rights in 1791, some 15 years of continuous debate and amendment to the original Articles of Confederation took place.  The result of that concentrated, intellectual focus is the present-day US Constitution.  It is acknowledged to be the pre-eminent exponent of the separation of powers and the rule of law.
Today:
·        the President nominates Supreme Court Justices, but they are not appointed until the Senate approves.
·        The President selects his Cabinet, but they do not sit in Congress.
·        The President nominates them, but their appointment is subject to approval by the Senate.
And the Judicial Branch with its power to declare laws unconstitutional, and to review actions of the government, is a check on the Legislative and Executive branches.
It is a written constitutional system that has lasted longer than any other written Constitution in the history of the world.
By comparison what did we West Indians do during the early independence period?
·        With little or no public involvement or public education the Foreign Office bestowed its Westminster-style Independence Constitutions on our unsuspecting people with the willing collaboration of our leaders.
·        Since then from Jamaica and the Bahamas in the north to Trinidad and Guyana in the south we have stumbled from one unsatisfactory new Constitution to the other with little or no sustained public debate or participation.
In my submission the principal defect in our institutions of governance has been the absence of checks and balances in our Constitutions.  The result of this lack has been universally acknowledged poor governance in all our states and territories.  Where there is bad governance it is the people who pay.  The daily demonstrations of venality, incompetence, and hubris shown by our leaders cause the ordinary person to hold our constitutional arrangements in quiet contempt.
The people demand that the core of the system be changed.  Measures that guarantee good government must be introduced and enforced through our Constitutions.  What use is a law that states that a national Budget must be presented to the House of Assembly each year by a certain date?  That provision must be in the Constitution for a citizen to be empowered to take steps to enforce it.  It is only if checks and balances reside in the Constitution that corrective measures will be safe from sabotage and the average concerned citizen will be able to seek the help of the court to ensure compliance.
Antigua and Barbuda is not the only West Indian country where a Judge of the Supreme Court can retire from the bench and move smartly into well-paid employment by one of the most frequent litigants who appeared before him previously.
What confidence can our people have in the rule of law when our judges are willing immediately after they have brought their judicial career to an end to take up employment with a litigant who repeatedly appeared before them?  Such conduct brings the judicial bench on which he swore to serve to the best of his ability into public contempt.  When that happens we should not be surprised if the disappointed litigant wants to go back and look at the judgment the judge delivered against him even while he was contemplating taking up such a questionable post-retirement career.
Antigua and Barbuda is not the only Caribbean country where Ministers of Government retire as millionaires after a few years of allegedly public service.
We accept it as part of the perks of office that a Minister can, with apparent impunity, both divert public resources for his or his friends’ benefit and accept gifts or ‘campaign donations’ for the award of government licences and permits.  What type of public leadership do we have when our Ministers act as what in Sicily is known as the “Capo di tutti capi”?
Antigua and Barbuda is not the only OECS country where a police officer can spend his entire career having done nothing more onerous than moving brown-paper bags of money and contraband from one part of the country to the other.
What guidance do we offer our youth when they view law enforcement as nothing more than a drugs gang, an armed one operating with the full force of the State behind them?
As the late Tim Hector explained in ‘The Outlet’ many years ago when he questioned how Immigration Officers could meet Santo Domingo ladies at the plane door and escort them to their places of work all while wearing their official uniforms, ‘First they start by providing protection services;  then they realise they can make more money owning the business’.
In my view a concern over whether the Senate should be abolished, or an elected Chamber put in its place, or whether there should be a unicameral parliament, is a mere tinkering with the trappings.  Changing from a Monarchy to a Republic, desirable though it undoubtedly is, does not improve our system of government.  Replacing the Privy Council by the CCJ, though long overdue, does nothing to improve the common man’s perception of whether he will get better justice.  When lawyers and politicians discuss these questions, and claim they are aiming for “constitutional reform”, the public lose interest and public apathy reigns.  These issues do not touch on the real question that concerns the average citizen:  the absence of effective measures to rein-in the kidnapping of the instruments of governance over the past 50 years.
There are three elements universally accepted as essential for good government:  Integrity, Accountability, and Transparency.  We require good governance institutions to be put in place, protected by constitutional guarantees.  Without entrenchment in the Constitution good governance provisions can be easily avoided by changing the law.
So let us now look briefly at each of the three preconditions of Integrity, Accountability and Transparency.
Integrity in public life is an elusive objective at the best of times.  US and UK public servants succumb to temptation just as frequently as ours do.  The difference is that in the UK parliamentarians have gone to jail for fiddling expense accounts.  In the US congressmen have been indicted and jailed for accepting bribes.  You will search our islands’ law reports in vain for any punishment meted out to public servants known to have left office hugely enriched by their public service.
The solution is for our Constitutions to put in place ‘watchdog institutions’ designed to ensure integrity in our systems of government.  What are some of the most obvious ones?
The Interests Commissioner, or Integrity Commissioner, is intended to receive declarations and reports from public officers of their assets and liabilities.  In most of our territories there is no requirement that public officers declare their interests.  And where there is such a requirement it is usually not enforced.  If the obligatory declaration is not made there is no compulsory punitive consequence.  If a declaration is filed there is usually no obligation for it to be available for public inspection.  It is kept secret by the Speaker and is of no use to the public.
An obvious way to give the provision teeth is for the Constitution to provide that a public officer is automatically removed from office with a right of appeal, if the Integrity Commissioner determines that he or she has failed to comply with the requirements for registration of interests.
The Constitution should provide a mechanism to ensure that the office of Integrity Commissioner receives the resources needed to carry out its functions, free of any political control.
Our Constitutions should require that Codes of Ethics for persons in public life are put in place and strictly enforced.
Other Commonwealth countries have excellent handbooks to guide Ministers, Legislators, and other senior public officers on the correct protocols to be followed as they enter into office.  This is how you teach ethical conduct.  We could easily adapt these handbooks for our use.
All persons in public life can benefit from compulsory attendance at seminars and workshops on the meaning of nepotism, cronyism, and conflicts of interest before taking up office.
The Constitution should provide that a serious breach of the Code of Ethics for Persons in Public Life as determined by the Integrity Commission should result in immediate removal from office, subject to a right of appeal to the court.
Much of our budget is spent on developing infrastructure, repairs and maintenance.  Procurement of goods and services relating to contracts for roads, and schools, and offices, and hospitals, offers the most attractive opportunity for those who wish to corrupt the process and illegally enrich themselves.  After all, as the public officer ‘on the take’ explains, “The cow must feed where she tie.”
Procurement and tendering require the highest standards and procedures.  The Integrity Pacts recommended by Transparency International would carry the procurement process upwards to an entirely new level of integrity.  The solution is to enshrine our Tenders Boards in the Constitution and protect them from outside influence.
An important requirement for ensuring integrity in public life is the constitutional protection of public assets, mainly land, mineral, and fishing rights.  In many of our territories Crown lands and national assets are dealt with by Ministers and Permanent Secretaries secretly, behind closed doors.  Since every matter discussed in Cabinet is treated as a state secret there is no public awareness of proposals for the disposition of public assets.  The integrity of dealings in public lands and assets must be guaranteed by having a provision in the Constitution that any proposal to deal in any significant public asset, say a half acre of land or more, or the grant of an oil prospecting licence, must first be brought to the legislature for public debate and approval.
It is generally accepted that any form of government that does not encourage public participation ensures the opposite of good governance.  Since the introduction of universal suffrage in the West Indies after the Second World War a type of democracy has germinated in these islands.  It is still only a slip of a plant, not yet a mature tree.  Bad governance everywhere, flowing from the concentration of power in the hands of a few, has held back a full flowering of our democracy and national development.
Self-discipline, and a strong sense of public service, are as essential for good governance as is the limiting of the power of the executive to dispense patronage at the public expense.  Self-discipline is in short supply everywhere.  The British bequeathed to us a “winner takes all” system of appointments that is ripe for abuse.  Immediately a new government is appointed, the first order of business is the wholesale termination of the previous political appointees.  The new administration then shares out the various directorships among their own principal supporters.  We watch helplessly as they dismantle the Boards governing Social Security, Public Utilities, Public Health, the Tourist Board, Carnival Committee, and even the Poor Law Board.  They call it “enjoying the fruits of office”.  We think it is normal but it isn’t.  This system of replacing one set of incompetent political appointees with another set makes a mockery of the whole notion of good governance.
Congressman Sergeant’s much repeated ‘bon mot’ dating back to the 1820s that “He who appoints can disappoint” is neither a validation nor a justification for the wholesale looting of the organs of government that we in the Caribbean have to suffer every time there is a change of administration.  The solution is to ensure in the Constitution that either a Committee of the Legislature, or a constitutionally protected Appointments Commission, is empowered to vet and approve, or disapprove, all appointments to and removals from government Boards, Committees and Commissions.  No person should be appointed to a public board by a Minister without being first certified as competent to perform the functions of the office
The second area of checks and balances that promote good governance is that of accountability.  At present the only device we the public have for ensuring accountability in our government is the right to remove them from office every 5 years.  By itself general elections have proven ineffective as a means of ensuring good governance.  In all our countries the Opposition promises to bring clean government once elected.  One candidate in recent a foreign election famously promised if elected to “Clean the Swamp”.  He was so convincing, dishonest, unstable, and immoral though he is, that the people elected him.  We see the consequences today. 
Everywhere in our islands the Opposition and the Administration laugh at us behind our backs as they take it in turn to plunder our resources for their private enrichment while protecting each other from prosecution as each takes his turn at the trough.  We have to find more effective alternatives, watchdog institutions, to ensure that government is truly held accountable for its actions and omissions.
Without an effective, properly resourced, Ombudsman, the citizen must rely for enforcing his rights against an unfair or biased public officer on going to Court.  And we all know how expensive the process, and how unsatisfactory the outcome, frequently is.  There is no accountability for perverse or biased administration in the absence of a properly resourced Ombudsman.
Complaints by members of the public of abuse by police officers are usually heard in private by a Commissioner of Police or his Deputy.  This is not a satisfactory grievance process.  It is not transparent and even when honestly conducted leads to public distrust.  Without an independent and constitutionally protected Police Complaints Authority the public cannot be faulted for believing that police officers are not accountable for their acts of misconduct.  It must be no longer satisfactory for complaints against police officers to be handled internally and in secret as presently occurs.
Today the citizen’s fundamental rights can only be protected by the individual bringing a law suit at great personal cost.  One solution as in Ghana and other Commonwealth countries is to place the protection of the individual’s rights in the hands of a publicly funded institution whose terms and conditions of service are protected by the Constitution.  This is the Human Rights Commissioner or the Administrative Justice Board.  Such a provision guarantees accountability when public officers abuse the rights of a member of the public.
In most of our countries it is nearly impossible to obtain any information on what files government departments hold on us.  There is frequently no public information on the programmes or activities of any agency of government.  The result is a lack of accountability in government.  Constitutionally mandated Freedom of Information Acts are long overdue.  There is no surer mechanism for guaranteeing accountability than an FOI Act and the various Regulations that make it work.  No administration has ever been in favour of freedom of information.  That alone is a telling point in its favour.
The Public Accounts Committee is perhaps the most effective mechanism enabling Members of the Legislature to monitor and oversee the manner in which public officers have spent the monies voted by the Legislature.  The PAC exists in theory in all of our Constitutions, yet, due to lack of political will, deprivation of resources, and a lack of training, it functions properly in few of our Territories.  We must demand accountability from the public officers who are entrusted with the collecting and spending of the public’s money by ensuring there is a properly functioning Public Accounts Committee.
The third key element of good governance is Transparency.  It is the lack of transparency in our systems of government that cause so many of our ministers’ actions to be wrongfully categorised as corrupt.  There are watch-dog type provisions that can be entrenched in the Constitution to improve transparency.
Unless all appointments to the teaching service, the police service, and the public service generally, are constitutionally placed in the hands of professional and independent Public Service Commissions, governed by appropriate laws and regulations, and trained in the proper exercise of their functions, and with no political input, there will be no public confidence in the independence and integrity of the public service.
The lack of transparency in the exercise of the prerogative of mercy is a most unsatisfactory state of affairs in most of our countries.  The Governor or the Prime Minister usually has the constitutional power to function without any local Mercy Committee to advise him on what to do about early releases from prison.  They can do it on a whim.
Independent, politically balanced Boundaries Commissions are essential for guaranteeing public confidence in our elections systems.  Unlike in Antigua and Barbuda there is no provision in Anguilla for a Boundaries Commission.  The boundaries have not been revised in over 50 years resulting in gross imbalances.  The modern practice of having the electoral boundaries re-examined periodically to ensure voter balance should be universal in the Caribbean.
The old, discredited practice of hiding every decision and action of a government agency in the dark has proven not conducive to good governance.  It is axiomatic that the best medicine against infection is sunlight and fresh air.  A constitutionally mandated Open Meetings provision would enable public access to all government meetings and promote transparency.  There is no reason why the Constitution should not contain a clause requiring all governmental meetings such as those of Building Boards, Land Development Committees, Boards of Governors of Schools and Hospitals, and Cabinet itself, to be open to the press and public, within reason.  This would ensure that their decisions are transparent.
Departments of government are generally expected to publish Annual Departmental Reports.  This requirement for transparency in the public service was strictly enforced during the earlier colonial period but seems to have fallen into disuse in many of our states and territories.  These reports, even when they are prepared today, seldom reach the public eye.  The Constitution should insist on it and require them to be published on government websites for the public to have free access to them.
Too many of our Premiers and Prime Ministers develop a God-delusion.  Worse, if their party continues to be elected to office beyond two terms, they develop a sense of entitlement and ownership of the country’s assets.  Elected representatives particularly after they are appointed Ministers sometimes seem to forget that the public placed confidence in their promise to serve.  A power of recall in the Constitution would be as a constant reminder of their vulnerability if they are seen to betray the confidence of the public.  They would be encouraged to act with transparent honesty if only out of a sense of self-preservation.
A fixed date for general elections is another obvious constitutional precaution against abuse of the electoral system by a Prime Minister who is always at risk of becoming more conscious of his power and privilege than of his promise to serve the public good.
Effective provisions for the management of public finances need to be entrenched in the constitution.  A sound, modern West Indian Constitution would include requirements that,
·        The macro-economic and fiscal policies of Government are formulated for the sustained long-term prosperity of the people;
·        Public funds are managed on principles of value for money;
·        Government must formulate a Fiscal Framework, approved by the legislature, setting limits to public debt relative to public revenue, and setting levels of reserves;
·        Every 6 months the Minister of Finance must report to the House of Assembly on the performance of Government in implementing the Fiscal Framework and on the state of the public finances and the economy;
·        Where an Appropriation Act will not return a surplus budget the Minister must lay before the Assembly a statement explaining the reasons;
·        Where an Act authorises a person to vary a tax that person must report to the Assembly every 6 months;
·        At least 6 weeks before the new financial year, to give time for public discussion, the Minister must present to the Assembly the estimates of revenue and expenditure
·        Discussion on the Budget must include an assessment of performance against debt sustainability as set out in the Fiscal Framework;
·        All borrowing must be authorised by an Act and be in accordance with the Fiscal Framework;
·        The Minister must report to the Assembly every 6 months as to the total indebtedness, and servicing of loans;
·        Any agreement by Government to give a loan must be of no effect unless approved by the Assembly;
·        The Public Accounts Committee and the Appropriations Committee must have power to summon witnesses to testify on oath in public hearings;
·        Six-monthly reports of the Appropriations Committee and the Public Accounts Committee on their activities relating to the public finances must be promptly published on the government website;
·        Since a Commission that has fallen out of favour is likely to be neutralised by the Administration starving it of funds, the provision of resources for Institutions of Good Governance must be removed from the control of the political directorate and placed directly in the hands of the Assembly;
·        The remuneration of Members of the Assembly must be governed by statute.  Any Bill for increasing the allowances of members of the Assembly must first be recommended by the Integrity Commission, and published; and finally
·        All reports of the Chief Auditor must be laid before the Assembly for debate, and promptly published.
If bad government now seems entrenched in our islands, we have no one to blame but ourselves.  The press, the media generally, members of the public, the Bar Association, and the judiciary, all have to admit our share of responsibility for the lack of standards of government.  We have failed to demand and to achieve genuine transparency, integrity and accountability by our governments to our people.  Our politicians may not always be of the highest integrity or morals.  But, by our ensuring there are effective watchdog institutions enshrined in our Constitutions, their greater excesses can be restrained.
This is a revised edition of the speech I have given several times in recent years on the need for checks and balances.  
It was designed to be the Time Kendall Public Lecture, intended to be delivered at a meeting of the Antigua and Barbuda Bar Association at a public function on 21 September 2017 at the Commencement of the new Law Term, but which was cancelled due to the effects of Hurricane Irma, and instead circulated to all members of the Bar.

Thursday, November 03, 2016

Constitutional Reform - A Personal Perspective

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I have been around for so long that I can remember the Mighty Sparrow when he was a teenager.  I was a 10 year-old student in Trinidad in 1956 when he won his first Road March with “Jean and Dinah”.  I was 12 years old when the West Indies Federation, now only a distant memory, was formed, and I was 16 when it broke up.
When I was a youth growing up, my Grenadian father worked for Tate & Lyle, a multinational corporation with sugar interests in Trinidad and in Jamaica.  Though neither Eric Williams nor Michael Manley was a regular visitor to our home, my father’s involvement with them and their governments was a topic for discussion around the lunch table.  As early as the 1950s, my father and Dr Williams represented employers and labour respectively at ILO meetings in Geneva.  Towards the end of our residence in Trinidad, in the 1970 State of Emergency caused by the Black Power Uprising, my father served on Dr Williams’ National Security Council.  Dr Williams needed his company’s pest-spraying aeroplanes to keep an eye on the mutinying army and to report back to the loyal government forces that eventually overcame them.  In later years, he told us many stories of the outcomes of some of those National Security meetings.
I am sure that, to the day he died earlier this year, Geddes Granger (Makandal Daaga), the 1970 leader of the Black Power Movement of Trinidad, was unaware of the role played by the American CIA in defeating him.  They sent a black agent, sporting a huge afro hairstyle, to lead a mob in smearing human excrement on the inside walls of the Cathedral of the Immaculate Conception in Port of Spain.  This sacrilegious act was guaranteed to turn the mainly Roman Catholic, urban, black middle-class resolutely against the Black Power Movement, ensuring its collapse within weeks.  I heard the details of the story, brought back to the dinner table by my father from National Security Council meetings, and recounted many times.
After he negotiated the sale of Caroni Ltd by Tate & Lyle to the Williams administration, my father was persuaded by Dr Williams to accept Trinidad and Tobago citizenship for him and my mother as a gift from his Government.
In 1971, Tate & Lyle transferred my father to Jamaica where, as Managing Director of the West Indies Sugar Company, he ended his career selling the company’s assets to the Michael Manley Government.  The month after he concluded negotiations for the sale of WISCO to the Jamaica government in 1973, my father died.  I well remember the Prime Minister’s dramatic attendance at his funeral in Kingston.  He arrived at the church by helicopter, scattering the curious children who had come running into the churchyard to find out what all the noise was about.
In addition to what I learned of the foibles and cupidity of our governments at my father’s lunch table, I have lived and worked as lawyer and judge in all nine countries of our OECS, from Grenada in the south to Tortola in the north.  To this day, I still read the digital editions of one or more daily and weekly newspapers from most of them.  I have been an observer of government in all our nations, both independent and those still colonies.  I have been honoured to have served as the chairperson of a Constitutional Reform Commission in 2006 and a Constitutional and Electoral Reform Committee in 2015, both established by Governments of Anguilla.  I hope the recounting of this personal history persuades you that I have some basis of experience on which to comment on our system of governance.
This is a mighty mansion of a topic, and I do not pretend to be as qualified as some of you in this room are to explore the depth and width of the many rooms and halls of the structure.  For the purpose of this talk, I limit myself to a specific area of my concern.  Why did independence go so wrong for so many of us?  What was the principal cause of our national failure in constitution-building, and what, if anything, can be done to remedy the situation?
To lay the background to my premise, that our independence Constitutions have failed the man on the St Georges’ mini-van, let me briefly compare what the US fathers of their Constitution did to what the fathers of our West Indian Constitutions did.  And, in doing so, I will take some liberties with accuracy in the interest of conciseness.  For my purposes, I will paint the picture of our state of affairs with a broad brush and with bright colours, eschewing pastels and fine shading.
Between the Declaration of Independence of 1776 and the adoption of the US Constitution in 1787, and of the Bill of Rights in 1791, some 15 years of continuous debate and amendment to the Articles of Confederation took place.  The result of this concentrated, intellectual focus is the present-day US Constitution, acknowledged to be the pre-eminent exponent of the separation of powers and the rule of law.  Today, the President nominates Supreme Court Justices, but they are not appointed until the Senate approves.  The President selects his Cabinet, but they do not sit in Congress.  The President nominates them, but their appointment is subject to approval by the Senate.  In addition to legislative checks on the Executive, there are legislative checks on the Judiciary.  The Executive branch is vested with powers to supervise both the Legislative and the Judicial branches.  And, the Judicial Branch with its power to declare laws unconstitutional, and to review actions of the government, is possessed of checks on the Legislative and on the Executive branches.  It is a written constitutional system that has lasted, with amendment from time to time, for longer than any other written Constitution in the history of the world.
By comparison, what did we in the West Indies do?  From Jamaica and the Bahamas in the north to Guyana in the south, commencing in the year 1961, we have stumbled from one unsatisfactory Constitution to the other.  With little or no public involvement or public education, the Foreign Office bestowed our Westminster-style Independence Constitutions on our unsuspecting people.  Despite tinkering with the peripheries of the system, our Constitutions have proven to be inadequate and unsatisfactory.  Far from being confederated, our West Indies are still divided, quarrelsome, ineffective, and ill-governed.
In my submission, the principal defect in our institutions of governance has been a lack of checks and balances in our Constitutions.  The result has been universally acknowledged poor government in all our states and territories.  Where there is bad governance, it is the people who suffer.  The venality, incompetence, and hubris, not to mention complicity in sacrilege, shown by our elected leaders, cause outside observers to hold us in quiet contempt.  The people demand that the system be changed, and measures that guarantee good, accountable government introduced and enforced through our Constitutions.
There are three elements universally accepted as essential for good government.  They are integrity, transparency, and accountability.  In the absence of conventions promoting good governance, only the legal system can ensure it.  The highest form of law in our region is the Constitution.  We require good governance institutions to be put in place protected by constitutional guarantees.
Let us now look at each of integrity, accountability and transparency.
Integrity in public life is an elusive objective at the best of times.  In the UK, parliamentarians have gone to jail for fiddling their expenses, and, in the US, congressmen have been indicted for accepting bribes.  You will search our islands largely in vain for any punishment meted out to politicians known to have left office hugely enriched by their public service.
No sensible person would suggest that our politicians are persons who naturally lack integrity.  However, the system of government that we have inherited seems almost designed to encourage us to give up our natural integrity.  The obvious solution is for our Constitutions to put in place ‘watchdog institutions’ that are designed to ensure integrity in our systems of government.  What are some of the most obvious ones?  They are independent Interests Commissioners; professional Tenders Boards with security of tenure; constitutional restrictions on dealing in public assets without parliamentary approval; independent Appointments Commissions to review all Ministerial appointments to Boards and Government Committees; and enforceable Codes of Ethics for all persons in public life.
The Interests Commissioner, sometimes called the Integrity Commissioner, is intended to receive declarations and reports from public officers of their assets and liabilities.  In most of our territories there is no requirement that public officers declare their interests.  And, if there is such a requirement, there is no obligation for the declaration to be available for public inspection.  And, if the declaration is not filed, there is often no punitive consequence.  It is essential for us that this filing be done before, during and after taking up office.  In the exercise of her functions the Integrity Commissioner is not to be subject to the direction of any other person or authority.  The appointment should be made by the Governor-General after consulting the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition.  The Constitution should provide a mechanism to ensure that the office receives the resources needed to carry out its functions.  The Constitution must provide that a Minister can be removed from office, with a right of appeal, if the Integrity Commissioner finds that he or she has breached the Code of Ethics for public life, or if he or she has failed to comply with the registration of interests requirement on two separate occasions.
We need Tenders Boards to be enshrined in our Constitutions, and protected from outside influence.  Much of our budget is spent on developing infrastructure, repairs and maintenance.  Procurement of goods and services, relating to contracts for roads and schools and offices and hospitals, offers the most attractive opportunities for those who wish to corrupt the process and illegally enrich themselves.  In my island, I know of one contractor who boasts that he has a “mole” in the Tenders Board who, for a commission, feeds him information that will ensure that he or his partners are successful in any bid.  We must insist on the highest standards and procedures in relation to procurement and tendering.  We need appropriate laws and regulations to set out how public contracts are to be awarded.  The Integrity Pacts recommended by Transparency International would carry the process upwards to an entirely new level.
The third requirement for ensuring integrity in public life is the constitutional protection of public assets, mainly land, mineral, and fishing rights.  In many of our territories, Crown lands and national assets are dealt with behind closed doors.  Since every matter discussed in Cabinet is treated as a state secret, there is no public awareness of proposals for the disposition of public assets.  There is no accountability.  The integrity of dealings in public lands ought to be enforced by having a provision in the Constitution that any resolution to deal in any significant public asset, say a half acre or more of land, is required to be brought to the legislature for public debate and approval.
The British have bequeathed to us a “winner takes all” system of appointments.  Immediately a new government is appointed, the first order of business is to terminate the previous political appointees and to share out the various directorships among the principal supporters of the new administration.  We watch as they dismantle the Boards governing Social Security, Public Utilities, Public Health, the Tourist Board, Carnival Committee, and even the Poor Law Board.  We call it “enjoying the fruits of office”.  This system of replacing one set of incompetent political appointees with another set makes a mockery of the whole notion of good governance.  Either the Legislature or a constitutionally protected Appointments Commission should be empowered to vet all appointments to government Boards, Committees and Commissions before they take office.
Codes of Ethics for persons in public life should be put in place and strictly enforced.  The British Cabinet Office has developed a series of handbooks to guide public servants and ministers on the correct protocols to be followed by incoming Ministers.  Other Commonwealth countries[1] have excellent handbooks for Ministers, Legislators and other public officers.  These could easily be adapted for our use.  Workshops for incoming Ministers, Boards of statutory corporations and public servants should be a regular feature of the administration's drive to achieve good governance.  All of persons in public life can benefit from compulsory attendance at seminars and workshops on the meaning of nepotism, cronyism, and conflicts of interest.  If Judges and Lawyers can subject themselves to Codes of Ethics, why not all public servants and politicians?
The second area of checks and balances that promote good governance is that of accountability.  There are recognised devices, other than general elections every 5 years, which ensure that government is held accountable for its actions and omissions.  These are traditionally considered to be the Complaints Commissioner; a Freedom of Information Act; and a functioning Public Accounts Committee.
The Complaints Commissioner is another name for the Ombudsman.  Without an Ombudsman, the citizen must rely for enforcing his rights against an unfair or biased public officer on going to Court.  And, we all know how expensive and unsatisfactory that can be.  We also need an independent Police Complaints Authority.  Complaints by the public against the conduct of a police officer are usually heard and determined in private by the Commissioner of Police.  This system is not transparent, and leads to public distrust.  Some progress is being made.  Bermuda, Jamaica and St Lucia have introduced statutory civilian oversight bodies, though these may only make recommendations to the Commissioner who retains the primary duty to take disciplinary action against officers.  In the UK the Independent Police Complaints Commission[2] has the power to take over a police complaints investigation and to make binding recommendations to the relevant Chief Constable.  What is certain is that it is no longer satisfactory for complaints against police officers to be handled internally and in secret as presently occurs.
We need to consider constitutionally providing for a Human Rights Commissioner:  Today, the citizen’s fundamental rights can only be protected by the individual at great personal cost.  The solution is to place the protection of the individual’s rights in the hands of a publicly funded institution.  This is sometimes called the Human Rights Commissioner or the Administrative Justice Board. 
In most of our countries, it is nearly impossible to obtain any information on the programmes or activities of any department of government, or to discover what files government departments hold on us.  Constitutionally mandated Freedom of Information Acts are long overdue.  There is no surer mechanism for guaranteeing transparency than a FOI Act and the various regulations that make it work.
The Public Accounts Committee is perhaps the most effective mechanism designed by our Constitutions to enable Members of the Legislature to question and investigate the manner in which public officers have spent the monies voted by the Legislature.  The PAC exists in theory in all of our Constitutions, yet, due to lack of political will and lack of training, it functions properly in few of our Territories.
The third key element of good governance is transparency.  It is the lack of transparency in our systems of government that cause so many of our ministers’ actions to be wrongfully categorised as corrupt.  Contrary to public opinion, most politicians are not engaged in making back-room deals and accepting under-the-table packages.  Only the insecure and the deceitful among our elected leaders are afraid of showing transparency.  The self-confident and the honest welcome it:  The introduction of mechanisms and techniques for guaranteeing transparency would give them the tools to demonstrate their honesty, effectiveness and integrity.
Systems that increase transparency include the appointment of civil servants, teachers and the police by truly independent Service Commissions; the exercise of the prerogative of mercy by Mercy Committees; the regular revision of electoral boundaries by independent Boundaries Commissions; and opening up Cabinet Meetings and all government committee meetings to the public.
Unless all appointments to the teaching service, the police service, and the public service generally, are constitutionally placed in the hands of professional and independent Public Service Commissions, governed by appropriate laws and regulations, and trained in the exercise of their functions, there will be no public confidence in the independence and integrity of the public service.
In most of our territories, the Governor has the constitutional power to function without any local Mercy Committee to advise him on what to do about early releases from prison.  In some, the Prime Minister can do it on a whim.  This is a most unsatisfactory state of affairs.
Independent, politically balanced Boundaries Commissions are essential to guarantee public confidence in our elections systems.  There is no reason why the modern practice of having the electoral boundaries re-examined after every population census should not apply universally.
Open Meetings legislation allows public access to government meetings, and ensures that their decisions are transparent and publicised.  There is no reason why the Constitution should not contain a clause requiring all governmental meetings such as those of Building Boards, Land Development Committees, Boards of Governors of Schools and Hospitals, and Cabinet itself, to be open to the press and public, within reason.  The old, discredited practice, probably deriving from an outdated British Official Secrets Act, of hiding every decision and action of a department of government has proven itself not to be conducive to good governance.
Departments of government are generally expected to publish Annual Departmental Reports for laying before the legislature.  This requirement was strictly enforced during the earlier colonial period, but seems to have fallen into disuse in many of our territories. These reports, even when they are prepared, seldom reach the public eye.  They should be insisted on, and required to be published on government websites for the public to have access to them at will.
If a common sense approach to good government is ineffective, then the Constitution should mandate that Cabinet meetings are opened up to the public whenever possible.  Post-Cabinet Press Conferences encourage public confidence in the functioning of government.
In Anguilla, we are taking integrity, accountability, and transparency a step further.  The Constitutional and Electoral Reform Committee, established by government to prepare a new Constitution and a new Elections Act, has taken recommendations from the public.  Anguilla wants to see a provision for a maximum two-term limit for the Premier;  a power for the electorate to recall an elected representative who is felt to be performing unsatisfactorily;  and for there to be a fixed date for general elections.  Too many of our Premiers and Prime Ministers develop a God-delusion, and, worse, a sense of entitlement and ownership of the country if their party continues to be elected to office beyond two terms, invariably resulting in a deterioration in their integrity.  The Americans have cured this defect by instituting a maximum two-term limit after the death of 3-term President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, and we can learn from this salutary provision.  Elected representatives, particularly after they are appointed Ministers, sometimes lose their awareness that the public placed confidence in their promise to serve.  A power of recall should serve as a reminder of their vulnerability if they are seen to betray the confidence of the public.  A fixed date for general elections is another obvious constitutional precaution against abuse of the electoral system by a Prime Minister who becomes more conscious of his power and privilege than of his promise to serve the public good.
In conclusion, it is generally accepted that any form of government that does not encourage public participation is the opposite of good governance.  Since the introduction of universal suffrage in the West Indies after the Second World War, democracy has flourished in these islands.  If bad government now seems entrenched in our islands, we have no one to blame but ourselves.  Our politicians may not always be of the highest integrity, morals or standards.  But, by ensuring genuine accountability to the electorate, their greater excesses can be restrained.

A public speech delivered at the Annual Law Week of the Grenada Bar Association in St Georges, Grenada on 3 November 2016.



[1]    See, eg, the excellent series published by the Government of Queensland titled, The Queensland Ministerial Handbook, The Queensland Cabinet Handbook, The Queensland Legislation Handbook, The Queensland Protocol Handbook, and Welcome Aboard: A Guide for Members of Queensland Government Boards, Committees and Statutory Authorities.
[2]             http://www.ipcc.gov.uk/