Constitutional Reform Again

 

Constitutional and electoral reform is in the air again.  I heard the Minister on the radio some days ago promising that we should see the roll-out of Government’s new draft proposals that it intends to urge on the UK Foreign Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO), within the next month or two.

When Government publishes the promised draft Constitution, I shall study it carefully.  Will it be a version of the constitutional abortion that the AUF Administration in 2019 presented to the FCDO team during the November negotiations?  Or will it accord with the 2017 draft that the Constitutional and Electoral Reform Committee presented to the Government of Anguilla (GOA)?  Or will it be based on the 2020 FCDO draft that they sent GOA shortly after the 2019 consultations but which Government concealed from us until early 2022?  It can be found on the government website.  It is based on our locally produced 2017 draft.  I suggest that whatever Government proposes, it must be consistent with, if not identical to, the FCDO draft.  I wonder why Governments like keeping us in the dark about these matters for so long!

I don’t blame you for not remembering what the previous Administration did in 2019 to ruin our 2017 proposals for constitutional reform.  So much time and so many traumatic events have occurred since them, that the memory is hidden under psychological scar tissue.  So, I’ll briefly remind you of the assault by the AUF administration on the original reform proposals.  Those 2017 proposals (set out in a draft Constitution, Elections Act, and Electoral Boundaries Commission Act, emerged from extensive public discussions in person, on several radio stations, and in widely published newspaper articles and papers, between 2000 and 2017.  The AUF administration presented to the FCDO in 2019 their changes to the 2017 proposals with no real attempt to explain their changes to us, far less to secure our agreement with them.  These changes gutted the Committee’s 2017 reforms.

Electoral reform was part of the mandate of the 2000 David Carty Committee, the 2006 Commission, and the 2017 Committee.  The resulting draft new Elections Act of 2017 was contained in the 2017 Report.  The AUF Administration succeeded in 2019 in persuading the FCDO, in effect, to help them sabotage the most vital electoral reform proposals.

The first insult to the 2017 electoral reforms was to remove the provision for regulating campaign financing.  The people wanted to bring an end to the old vote-buying system.  Each party was to prepare and publish a budget showing where its campaign financing is coming from and how it will be spent.  They will go to jail if they are found to have lied.

In some countries, campaign financing legislation prohibits a political party from soliciting funds from the public.  Campaign financing laws limit each party’s spending only to the sum of money provided by government to each party.  That way, all parties are financially on the same footing.  You go to jail if you are found to have cheated.  The AUF’s draft Constitution completely omitted any mention of campaign financing.

Another 2017 provision that was left out without explanation was for the regular revision of the Voters List.  At present, there is continuous registration with no revision.  Once you get on the List, you can practically never be removed.  If you emigrate and remain away from Anguilla for forty years, you remain on the List.  The List is never cleaned up.  The Committee recommended it be revised every ten years after the usual decennial Census exercise.  The people demanded it.  They left it out.

Yet another provision that was omitted was to reform the Assembly by having thirteen elected seats instead of seven, to abolish the nominated members, and to remove the votes of the two ex-officio members.  They merely got rid of the nominated members.  The voters were supposed to be more fairly distributed among the constituencies as settled on by the Electoral Boundaries Commission, with nine more or less equal districts and four at-large seats.  In 2019, the AUF and the FCDO changed this without warning or discussion with us.  They imposed a rushed 2019 Amendment Constitution and an Elections Act that kept the same old unfairly populated seven constituencies, merely adding the four at large seats.  They omitted to abolish the position of Parliamentary Secretary, or to remove the voting power of the ex officio members, or to revise the boundaries.  They said it was too urgent to discuss.

This abortion of electoral reform missed the entire point of the exercise.  If it was designed to keep the incumbent party in office, it failed.  They lost the later 2020 elections.

Voters knew that the aim of the popular 2017 reform proposal was to ensure that Government would have six Ministers from the ranks of thirteen elected members of the Assembly.  With the proposed thirteen voting members distributed between six ministers, Government backbenchers, and the opposition, the six Ministers would never outnumber backbenchers plus the opposition.

Under the previous system, with four Ministers, a Parliamentary Secretary, and two ex officio members, (seven out of nine) ExCo dominated the Assembly.  The opposition hardly had a say in the deliberations.  The 2019 change to five Ministers, a Parliamentary Secretary, and two voting ex officio members (eight out of thirteen) did not alter the balance of control in the Assembly.  It was no reform at all.

Constitutional reform was the other part of the 2017 proposals to replace the 1982 Constitution.  What the AUF did in 2019 to amend the 1982 Constitution, just days before the general elections, was to cut the heart out of them.  And this without any explanation, save to assure us that the amendments were too “urgent” for further consultation.

What the FCDO did in 2019 in accepting the AUF’s betrayal of the 2017 constitutional and electoral reform proposals was to shore up ExCo’s domination of the Assembly.  With now five Ministers, two ex officio members, and a retained Parliamentary Secretary, ExCo controlled more than half of the thirteen voting members of the Assembly. 

An obvious omission made in the AUF’s 2019 Amendment Constitution was the Integrity Commission.  This watchdog institution was the most vital of the proposals for ensuring integrity, transparency, and accountability in Government going forward.  It may be obvious to us why the AUF omitted it without explanation, but we must insist it be put back in.  The FCDO’s draft 2020 Constitution now before us for discussion does so.

The 2017 public finance constitutional reforms were strongly resisted by the previous Administration.  In 2019, they circulated a paper claiming that these provisions were unnecessary as they were already present in existing laws.  In fact, they sprang from a draft Anguilla Public Finance 2015 Order in Council circulated by the FCO in that year.  This essentially proposed that Anguilla’s management of her public finances be turned over to a UK appointed official.  He would be empowered to cancel all ExCo decisions and repeal laws passed by the Assembly if he did not approve of them.  This caused an almighty stir in the community.  The FCDO backed off.

By 2015, because the Government of Anguilla had for so many decades been living beyond its means, its finances were in a disastrous state.  There were various statutes and Memoranda of Understanding with the FCDO that were designed to ensure that government spending was conducted in a regulated manner.  We never followed any of these statutes or agreements.  The FCDO must have been at its wits’ end.  That is why they wanted to impose on us by a 2015 Order in Council the rules we were supposed to be following.  To ensure the rules were followed, the control of our finances would be entirely placed in the hands of a UK administrator, superior even to the Governor.

What the 2017 Committee proposed was that we introduce the most important contents of the 2015 draft Order in Council into our Constitution.  We would, of course, omit the unacceptable provision that a UK bureaucrat could reverse decisions of our Cabinet and laws passed by our Assembly.

The idea behind our 2017 proposal was that if we imposed these financial management rules on ourselves through our Constitution, there would be no need for the UK to take our finances away from us.

Further, by our taking the financial management rules out of the previous long-ignored statutes and rules, and placing them in our Constitution, we would give the rules increased force.  Breach of them would be not only against a law but be unconstitutional.

It is essential that whatever our new Government proposes to the FCDO, it must be consistent with, if not identical to, the substance of the 2020 FCDO draft Constitution.  This draft came out of the negotiations conducted with the AUF’s negotiating team in November 2019.  Through this 2020 draft, the FCDO has redeemed itself from its earlier betrayal of us in 2019.  It accepts nearly every one of our 2017 proposals.  Only a few provisions remain to be resolved.  These are clearly marked in the FCDO draft and should be the only issues remaining for discussion.  None of them is particularly difficult.  Stay tuned.

GST Unconstitutional?

A friend telephoned me with a question.  Is the Goods and Services Tax Act (GST Act) unconstitutional?  I asked him what was the problem?  He responded that he had heard that the Anguilla Constitution did not authorize the ex-officio members of the House of Assembly, the Attorney-General and the Deputy Governor, to vote on a Bill in the Assembly.  They recently voted in favour of the GST Bill.  This allowed it to be passed by a majority of one.  If they had not voted, the Bill would not have become law.  What did I think of that?

I told him that in my opinion the ex-officio members were authorised to vote on any motion before the Assembly, save where they are specifically prohibited from doing so.

The public are presently being consulted by government on the contents of a draft new Constitution prepared by the Foreign and Commonwealth Development Office (FCDO) – based in large part on the desire of Anguillians for the proposed constitutional reforms.  If we object to ex-officio members voting in the Assembly, this might be a suitable time for Anguillians to insist that this is anti-democratic, and the new Constitution should provide that only elected members may vote.

Section 35 of the 1982 Anguilla Constitution says that the Assembly consists of the Speaker, eleven elected members, and two ex-officio members.  Since the 2020 general elections, seven of the elected members sit on the government benches.  Four sit on the opposition side.  The two ex-officio members also sit on the government benches.  That means there are a total of thirteen members of the Assembly, plus the Speaker.

On the vote for the passage of the GST Bill, two of the government Ministers voted against the Bill.  The total of elected members voting in favour of the Bill was five.  Six elected members voted against the Bill.  The two ex-officio members voted with the government members in favour of the Bill, making a total of seven to six in favour.

So, the question is, do the ex-officio members of the Assembly have the right to vote on a Bill before the Assembly?  The answer is to be found in the words of the Constitution and the Rules of Procedure made under it, the Legislative Assembly (Procedure) Rules 1976.

Section 53(1) of the Constitution says who can vote in the Assembly: “all questions proposed for decision in the Assembly shall be determined by a majority of votes of the members present and voting.”  Subsection (2) provides that the Speaker has a casting vote only when the votes are equally divided.  Otherwise, the Speaker does not vote.  It should be noted, by the way, that the international convention is that the Speaker usually exercises the casting vote to preserve the status quo, that is, they will vote so the situation does not change.

Section 55 is relevant.  It provides that, “any member may introduce any Bill or propose any motion for debate in, or may present any petition to, the Assembly, and the same shall be debated and disposed of according to the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly.”  In Anguilla, no one doubts that the A-G or the D-G may introduce any motion in the Assembly, and they occasionally do so.

Section 55(1) says that voting on Bills and Motions shall be governed by the Rules of Procedure.  So, what do the Rules say about voting in the Assembly?

The first rule to note is rule 45.  Paragraph (1) provides that, generally, voting is by voice.  Members respond with either a “Yea” or a “Nay” when called on to vote, and the Speaker declares the result.  When the Speaker declares, “The ayes have it.  The motion is passed,” no count is taken of who voted in favour, who did not, and who abstained.

Paragraph (2) provides that if a member calls for a “division”, the votes of the members are taken one by one, and each member’s vote is recorded in the Minutes.  Anguilla has had an Assembly to enact laws only since the previous 1976 Constitution.  The Council set up by the revolutionaries after separation from St Kitts in 1967 never enacted laws.  This vote on 29 July was, so far as I am aware, the first time in the short parliamentary history of Anguilla that a division was called for.

Never before had each member of Anguilla’s Assembly declared openly which side of a motion he or she voted for.  It cannot, therefore, truly be said that this is the first time the ex-officio members voted on a motion.  Though no count is taken on a voice vote, it must be assumed that the ex-officio members have always been included in the past among those who voted with the ministers.  As members of the Executive Council (ExCo) that is their duty under the principle of collective responsibility.

Section 25 of the Constitution may also be relevant.  Subsection (1) is the only section which limits who may vote on a motion.  It reads, “If a motion that the Assembly should declare a lack of confidence in the Government of Anguilla receives in the Assembly the affirmative votes of two-thirds of all the elected members thereof the Governor shall dissolve the Assembly and shall act in his discretion in appointing the date for the ensuing general election under section 64 of this Constitution” (my underlining for emphasis).

So, section 25 clearly provides that a vote on a motion of no confidence may only be cast by the elected members.  A vote of no confidence is a purely political act.  It would be improper to allow the non-elected members of the Assembly to have a say in whether the government should stand or should fall.  That would demonstrate a distinct democracy deficit.

This is the only case mentioned in the Constitution of the ex-officio members being prohibited from voting.  No other motion is restricted to the elected members.  What would be the point of specifically excluding the ex-officio members from voting on this occasion if they do not generally have the right to vote?

Other than section 25 (no-confidence motions) rule 46 provides one other exceptional case when a member is prohibited from voting.  That is, a member shall not vote where he or she has a “direct personal pecuniary interest” in the subject, ie, he or she has a conflict of interest.

From all the above, there can be no doubt that the ex-officio members of the Assembly have all the rights of members.  All members are qualified to vote, save where specifically prohibited.  In the case of members who also sit in ExCo, they are further constrained by the principle of collective responsibility to vote in support of every government measure introduced into the Assembly.  If they are unwilling or unable to do so, they should resign their office.

If the two ex-officio members declined to cast their vote in favour of the Bill and abstained, they would have betrayed their duty to ExCo.  Worse than that, from what we are told, the CDB would not have disbursed the loan and public service salaries would not have been paid.  It is unlikely that the public service would have been silent.  The likelihood is that the entire public service would have stayed home from 1 August.  The two ex-officio members would have been responsible for a major government crisis.

It will be interesting to see if salaries will be paid at the end of October.  Or will the FCDO permit more bank borrowing, or, perhaps, more raids on the Social Security Fund?  The banks and the directors of the Fund must know these loans will never be repaid unless the FCDO bails out the government again.  We have had more than half a billion dollars from them since the 2017 hurricane.  We have no right to expect such largess to continue.

GST Imposed?

 

On 29 July 2021 the Anguilla House of Assembly passed the GST Act into law.  Controversially, two Ministers of Government voted against the adoption of the Bill, while the two ex-officio members of the House, the Attorney-General (A-G), and the Deputy Governor (DG), voted in favour of the adoption of the law, thus ensuring that a slim majority of one was attained, and the GST Act was passed into law.

An uproar arose in the community when the significance of these events sunk in.  Members of the public protested on social media that the actions of the A-G and the DG contravened the convention that the ex-officio members do not vote.  The A-G and the DG never previously voted on any motion before the House.

Few appeared astonished that the two Ministers who voted against passage of the Act continued to function in government.  Every Anguillian schoolchild knows that ExCo is collectively responsible to the House of Assembly for the conduct of government.  Once ExCo has taken a decision, no member may express public dissent to it without resigning.  This is known as the principle of collective responsibility.  When the two Ministers did not resign their portfolios, they should have been dismissed by the Premier and gone to the back benches.  Instead, they continued to serve as Ministers as if nothing had happened. 

The main objection that was aired on the radio and other social media was that the Foreign and Commonwealth Development Office (FCDO) put unfair pressure on the local administration to enact the law.  This is a conspiracy theory.  It also misses the main point of the assault on the principle of collective responsibility.

The reason government insisted on passing the Act was that we were bound by our promise made in exchange for large sums of money to do so.  The lack of public consultation before the law was passed is a systemic problem in Anguilla.  It is standard operating procedure in Anguilla.  Until the present Speaker started insisting on it, it was almost unheard of for the public to be consulted on any proposed new law.  But whether there was adequate consultation or not, the Act had to be passed.

The FCDO say with justification that Anguilla’s government is too expensive.  In some cases, we employ five persons to do the job of one.  The FCDO point out to us that if we cannot raise the local revenue to pay public service salaries, we must either cut the cost of government or we must raise the taxes to pay for it.  They insist that there is no reason their British taxpayers should pay for Anguilla’s expensive government.

However, no Anguilla Government appears prepared to either cut back the numbers of the public service or reduce their remuneration.  It is said that it would be political suicide for government to do what is needed and make half the public service redundant.  The banks warned that letting go large numbers of public servants or reducing their salaries means that hundreds of loans will go into default, and social distress will explode.  The only alternative left is for us to raise our own resources to meet our public costs.

Meanwhile, employees in the private sector are not as pampered as the public service.  While hotels let their staff go for over a year on at most half pay, public servants continue to receive their pre-pandemic salaries in full.  There must be hundreds of private sector employees who are unable to pay their rent or their mortgage instalments.  Salt is rubbed into their wounds as the hotels curry favour by part-time employment of public servants.  These come cheap since there is no need to pay holiday pay, social security, medical insurance, or interim stabilisation levy on “temporary” gig workers.

The last Administration hired consultants to advise on the most appropriate way to raise additional revenue.  The recommendation was that a GST would do the job.  The Eastern Caribbean Central Bank (ECCB) and the Caribbean Development Bank (CDB) concurred.

Instead, we fell back on British taxpayers’ generosity to meet our over-indulgencies.  After Hurricane Irma in 2017, the last Administration got 60 million pounds sterling (EC$240 million at a four to one exchange rate) in grant aid from the FCDO.  This grant was labelled “humanitarian aid”.   In fact, it was earmarked for capital infrastructure, namely, the building of new facilities or the repair of damaged ones.  We had no reserves to pay for our structural upgrades ourselves.  In return, we promised that we would cease to rely on the British taxpayer and raise our own revenue in the future.  We would enact the GST Act.  We did not do so.

Early in the 2020 pandemic, and the closure of Anguilla’s economy, the previous Administration got a further EC$100 million in grant in aid.  This was intended specifically to pay civil servants for the following ten months.  In exchange, we promised again that we would either enact the GST or cut the cost of the public service.  We took the money.  We did not do as promised.  The previous Administration then lost the election.

The present Administration came into office a year after the first aid grant, accepting yet another EC$100 million from the FCDO.  We were given this aid on the repeated undertaking that we would do what the previous administration had promised:  either increase taxes to cover our expenses by enacting the GST or reduce our expenses.

The new Administration missed the perfect opportunity to bite the proverbial bullet and cut our public service expenses.  They had promised during the election campaign that they would not agree to accept the EC$100 million if it meant passing the GST.  But, once in office, they faltered and grabbed at the seemingly easy option of taking the money and agreeing in exchange to pass the tax into law.

The British taxpayers’ money did not last long.  It has run out.  Now, the CDB has agreed to make us a loan of EC$30 million on the same promise that we would pass the GST Act.  The CDB was more astute than the FCDO.  This loan was conditional.  If we didn’t pass the Act by a certain date, we wouldn’t get the loan.  We passed the Act just in time with the vote of the A-G and the DG.  Now public servants will get paid for the next three months.

The FCDO did not force us to pass the GST Act, as some are saying.  We took their money, and the money of others, on a solemn undertaking to begin to pay for our expensive government ourselves.  If we do not live up to our promises made in exchange for hard cash, then we are nothing but a bandit state.

We have no one to blame for our dire circumstances but ourselves.  Blaming the “white British” for our present problems is pure xenophobia if not downright racism.  Let us face it, Anguillians always delight in blaming others for our misfortunes.  We are never to blame.  It has always been so.

Poverty in Anguilla is being held out by the protesters against the GST as a reason why the GST Act should not be passed at this time.  There are some poor people in Anguilla.  The Annual Reports of the Department of Social Development do not provide any figures for the number of families in need.  A close examination of their most recent report for 2016 on the government website suggests the number is between 100 and 300 households.  We do have an obligation to prepare a social safety net to take care of those who through no fault of their own are unable to do so.  But even a blind person cannot be oblivious to the proliferation since Hurricane Irma in 2017 of SUVs and CRVs on the roads of Anguilla.  Even now, at the height of the Covid-19 pandemic, there are new villas going up on nearly every street corner in Anguilla.  There is no shortage of money in circulation in Anguilla.

One must conclude that Anguillians are generally a wealthy people.  There is no shortage of resources.  It is not as if we cannot afford to pay for our public services, which are presently subsidised.  Our culture of expecting all public services to be subsidised while we pay few or no taxes must change.  Our tradition of objecting to every increase in government fees and taxes cannot continue.

How we are going to pay for our public administration once the loan from the CDB runs out is going to be the question.

It will be interesting to see if the present Administration can continue to mamaguy the FCDO as the last administration did so masterfully.

Constitutional Reform Brief

To:      A Politician

From: Don Mitchell

Date:  21 July 2009

The question you have asked me is, what in my view are some of the basic Constitutional improvements everyone in Anguilla wants to see?  What are the bare minimum reforms that are needed?  What are the checks and balances that we now know will help Anguilla to be better governed in the future?

I think it is generally agreed that we need to see two major changes:

1. Internal self-government.  No one is saying that Anguilla is ready for independence.  No one in Anguilla is asking for political independence at this time.  But, the old colonial regime has been discredited.  The United Nations has been saying for years that colonialism must come to an end.  The British government has been saying for years that it does not want any colonies.  It wants only self-governing overseas territories.  Anguilla has been paying her way in the world without financial assistance from the British government for years.  The British government has said that it wants a partnership relationship with us[1].  We are ready for partnership.  What does this mean?

(a) Public Service:  Appointments, promotions and disciplining of civil servants should no longer be in the personal control of the Governor.  Appointments, promotions and discipline should be on merit, and should be in the control of an independent, local group of respected members of the community appointed to the Civil Service Commission by the Governor.

(b) Teachers:  Appointments, promotions and disciplining of teachers should no longer be under the personal, uncontrolled discretion of the Governor.  Teachers should be handled by an independent Teachers' Commission.  Teachers should no longer be lumped together with civil servants.

(c) Police:  Appointments, promotions and terms of service of police officers should no longer be under the personal control of the Governor.  These should be handled by an independent Police Service Commission.

(d) Chairing Executive Committee:  It is time that the Executive Council be chaired by the Chief Minister or Premier.  The Premier must discuss business with the Governor and listen to his advice, but no one has elected the Governor to make decisions about the affairs of Anguilla.

(e) The Governor:  The Chief Minister and the Leader of the Opposition should be consulted on the appointment of a new Governor.  They should see the curriculum vitae of the proposed appointee.  We have a right to be consulted on the type of person they are sending to be Governor of Anguilla.

(f) Cabinet:  Increase the size of Executive Council [Cabinet]:  The number of Ministers should be increased to take account of the increased burden of government in the 21^st Century.  Four persons to run the affairs of this country is unrealistic.  With increased self-government, there will be an even greater burden on Ministers.  We need a Cabinet of at least six persons.  This way, we can get rid of the office of Parliamentary Secretary.  If we keep the Parliamentary Secretary, we must make sure the total can never again exceed fifty percent of the size of the House.

(g) Ex-Officio Members of Cabinet:  Let the ex-officio members, the Attorney-General and the Deputy Governor, remain in Cabinet to advise.  However, they should have no vote.  The elected members take the benefit and the blame of their decisions.  Nobody elected the ex-officio members.

(h) Governor's reserved powers:  The Governor must consult with the Chief Minister on the exercise of his reserved powers.  It is embarrassing for a responsible local government to have to learn about the actions of the Governor for the first time by hearing it on the radio.

(i) DPP:  The decision to prosecute somebody for a serious crime should not be in the hands of a member of Cabinet, such as the Attorney-General.  The Constitution must provide for an independent Director of Public Prosecutions who does not take orders or advice from any politician.

(g) Power to return a Bill to the House:  The Governor cannot continue to refuse to a Bill if he returns it to the House once, and the House considers his recommendations and sends it back to him.  The people's representatives take the credit and the blame for what laws are passed.  No one elected the Governor to decide what laws can pass for Anguilla.

(h) Power of disallowance.  At the moment, the Secretary of State can reject any Bill passed into law by the Anguilla House of Assembly, and assented to by the Governor.  He must never again have the power of disallowance of a Bill passed by the Anguilla House of Assembly, except in strictly limited situations, eg, where the Act will bring Britain in breach of some international obligation or Treaty.

(i) Mercy Committee: At present the Governor has sole discretion in exercising the prerogative of mercy.  He decides in private and on his own.  No one knows what criteria he applies.  He should act on the advice of an independent group of citizens who follow recognised rules of procedure.

(j) Anguillian status:  Anguillians have for generations traveled the world seeking to improve themselves.  There are thousands of Anguillians around the world who do not have British citizenship.  These persons are deprived of their belongership, though they are recognised by all Anguillians as being Anguillian.  By contrast, Anguillian status, or belongership, is granted when an alien becomes naturalised in Anguilla.  Naturalisation is controlled by the British Nationality Act, and is not recognised as an Anguillian procedure.  This allows certain persons to avoid the constitutional provisions for acquiring belongership by residence, marriage, etc.  In future such persons should not be given Anguillian or belonger status.  British nationality should be removed from belonger status. 

2. Checks and balances.  Internal self-government requires that the public be confident that the opportunities for abuse by local leaders will be minimised.  It is no use taking the power away from a British civil servant and giving it to a local politician if the politician can use it to promote his family and friends.  What are some of the checks and balances that we can put in place?  Here is a shopping list, with no sense of priority.

(a) The House of Assembly must stop being a rubber-stamp for the Executive Council.  The main reason why this happens is that most members of the House are Ministers of government, or Parliamentary Secretaries, or Nominated Members, or Ex-Officio members of Executive Council.  The solution is to completely alter the structure of the House so that:

(i) Nominated Members must be done away with.  They are not elected and their presence is undemocratic;

(ii) Ex-officio members should not have a vote.  Nobody elected them to vote in the House.  They can stay in the House to advise the Speaker and the Members, but without the power to vote;

(iii) Increase the number of elected members so that the Ministers will never again fill most of the seats.  Let the House be big enough that a substantial part of it will always be independent of the Ministers.  One way to achieve this is to provide that Ministers can never be more than half of the House, eg, with 13 members, a maximum of 6 Ministers.

(iv) A vote of no confidence should pass on a simple majority.  The present position is that it takes a vote of three-quarters of the House.  That means that a minority government can continue to try to rule the country without ever being able to pass a law or a motion in the House.  That happened with Hubert's last government.  It should never be allowed to happen again.

(b) The Police should be under the control of an independent Police Complaints Authority.  It is wrong that if you have a complaint against a police officer you can only go to the Commissioner to complain about it.

(c) Ministerial Code of Ethics:  We can no longer leave it up to the private code of ethics of Ministers.  Ministers should be educated in how to deal with conflicts of interest, and they should promise to conform to a Ministerial Code of Ethics as is done in other countries.

(d) Voting at large:  The constituency system has its weaknesses.  The persons who get elected tend to be the ones with most family connections in the Constituency, or the ones who are rich enough to pay for votes.  If the whole country had to vote for some of the representatives, we can be sure that they would not be related to most of the people across the country, and they would never afford to pay off voters throughout the country.  It would bring to the House persons who were genuinely popular throughout the country.  In Montserrat, all the Members are elected this way, in BVI it is some of them.

(e) Campaign funding:  We need a law in place to provide for the regulation of political fund-raising.  We need to make politicians provide an audit of their political funds on a regular basis.  There should be stiff penalties for infringement. 

(f) Public Accounts Committee:  We need to strengthen the provision for this committee to keep an eye on public expenditure.  The committee is not provided for in the Constitution, and it has never sat.  We need to make sure this never happens again.

(g) Interests Commissioner:  There must be an entrenched provision for Members of the House to declare their assets and interests and for their declarations to be published, with severe penalties for infringement.  This is one of the most important anti-corruption measures that is missing from our Constitution.

(h) Crown land:  At the present time, the Governor deals in public land based on the advice of Executive Council.  There is no transparency.  Land is exchanged and leased without the public knowing anything about it.  In future, no land in excess of half an acre should be dealt in without a resolution or the House of Assembly.

(i) National Security Council:  There should be provision for such a Council to deal with national security issues.  It should be made responsible for all matters of policy and oversight relating to internal security, including the police force.

(j) Ombudsman/Human Rights Commissioner:  There should be provision for such an officer of Parliament to report to the House and to be independent of any government department.

(k) Boundaries Commission:  The Constitution should provide for an independent Commission to review the boundaries of parliamentary districts from time to time, say, after each census, and to ensure the districts are more or less equal in population size.

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[1]    In the Partnership for Progress White Paper.