PART 2
Good
Governance
The three
essential ingredients for assuring good governance are generally recognised, we
have said, to be (a) integrity, (b) accountability, and (c) transparency.
Let us deal with them one by one.
(a) Integrity: No sensible person would suggest that our
politicians are persons who naturally lack integrity. However, the system of
government that we have inherited, we have said, seems almost designed to
encourage us to give up our natural integrity once we achieve political power.
The obvious solution is for our legislatures to put in place what the TCI
Recommendations call
‘watchdog institutions’, and what I call ‘checks and balances’, which are
designed to ensure integrity in our systems of government. What are some of the
most obvious ones? We shall consider (i) the Interests Commissioner; (ii)
the Tenders Board; (iii) dealing in Crown land; (iv) an Appointments
Commission; and (v) Codes of Ethics.
(i)
Interests Commissioner: This office is sometimes called the Integrity Commissioner. It is designed
to receive declarations and reports from public officers of their assets and
liabilities. The usual, official explanation of this requirement is the need
for persons to be aware of any potential conflict of interest that may arise. The
more truthful explanation is that the citizen needs to know with what assets a
public servant commences public service, so that, in the event of an
unexplained jump in his wealth, inquiries can be made to determine whether the windfall
was legitimate or the result of corrupt conduct. In most of our territories
there is no law requiring public officers, that is, civil servants, politicians
and Ministers, to declare their interests. When there is a law, as there is in
Montserrat, it is usually not enforced or is without teeth.
In
Anguilla, the 2006 Report of the Constitutional and Electoral Reform
Commission made a recommendation
to the effect that this provision in the Constitution be strengthened. The
recommendation for TCI includes
ensuring that the Constitution establishes the office and provides a framework
for its operations that ensures its independence and impartiality. The exercise
of its functions is not to be subject to the direction of any other person or
authority. Similar to the existing provision for judges, the office should not
be allowed to be abolished during its tenure. The appointment should be made by
the Governor after consulting the Premier and the Leader of the Opposition. The
Constitution should provide a mechanism to ensure that the office receives the
resources needed to carry out its functions. The suggested mechanism is for the
Commissioner to submit a budget bid to the Appropriations Committee for
scrutiny and adoption, with the Governor having reserved legislative power to
ensure that an appropriation is in place within four months of each financial
year. A Minister can be removed from office if the Integrity Commission finds
that he or she has breached the Code of Conduct for Ministers, or if he
or she has failed to comply with the registration of interests requirements on
two separate occasions. Such a provision should be viewed as fundamental if
good governance is to be ensured.
The
TCI Recommendation is commendable because it provides for local supervision of
the political directorate. This is exactly the sort of democratic development
that we should be looking for in our new Constitutions if we are to see local
institutions taking control of good governance issues. It is regrettable that
it was not thought necessary to do the same for Montserrat. In Montserrat,
there is an Integrity Act, but the Commission is not established by the
Constitution. The Commission could be shut down tomorrow if the Governor were
dissatisfied with it. It is to be hoped that Anguilla will benefit from the
same provisions as the recommendations for the TCI.
(ii)
Tenders Boards: The second essential institution for the ensuring of
integrity in government is the Tenders Board. Much of our budgets in the BOTs
is spent on developing infrastructure, repairs and maintenance. Our procurement systems are essentially
lawless and unregulated. The system under which most of us presently operate is
an invitation to sharp practices. Procurement of goods and services, relating
to contracts for roads and schools and offices and hospitals, offers the most
attractive opportunities for those who wish to corrupt the process and
illegally enrich themselves. Newly employed public procurement officers are
coached by more experienced ones that, “The
cow must feed where she is tied”. This is a lesson that one must make the
most personal profit out of opportunities that will arise in ordering public
supplies. This system is fundamentally flawed.
A
Tenders Board that is genuinely meant to protect the public interest is
required to be established by the Constitution and insulated from outside
influence. There is in many cases, such as in Montserrat and Anguilla, not even
a governing law. Our Tenders Boards are committees of political appointees. The
resulting corruption damages not only governments, but also companies and
individuals in our communities.
No
provision for a constitutionally protected Tenders Board has been made in the TCI
Revised Recommendations. It must be a concern for us in Anguilla that on
these precedents the issue will continue be ignored or forgotten by the FCO when
we come to look at making new recommendations and adopting a new Anguilla
Constitution.
(iii)
Crown land: The third requirement for ensuring integrity in public life
is the constitutional protection of public assets, mainly land. In many of our
territories, Crown lands are dealt with under the signature of the Governor. In
practice, this means that the Governor relies on the advice of Cabinet, and
signs whatever is put in front of him. Since every matter discussed in Cabinet
is treated as a state secret, there is no public awareness of proposals for the
disposition of public assets. It is commonly assumed, and justifiably so in the
TCI particularly, that government Ministers deal in public lands for the
benefit of their families and friends. The integrity of dealings in public
lands ought to be enforced by having a provision in the Constitution that any
resolution to deal in any significant area of public land, say a half acre or
more, is required to be brought to the Legislature for public debate and
approval. In the case of Anguilla, this was the recommendation
of the 2006 Commission.
While
a majority of the participants at the public forums organised to discuss the TCI
Recommendations wished to see constitutional provisions set out how Crown land
would be managed and dealt with, a small minority felt this was not a topic for
constitutional inclusion. The result was a most unfortunate decision
to leave the power to deal with Crown lands in the hands of the Governor. We
know what this has meant in the past in the TCI when there have been weak
Governors and compliant A-Gs. The Governors have allowed Ministers of
government and senior public servants to misuse Crown lands for their own and
their families' profit.
The
consequence has been that the TCI Recommendation fails to seize the opportunity
to enshrine the protection of Crown land in any new Constitution. At most, the
recommendation is to develop a land policy and to leave it for the Governor and
his Ministers to continue to deal with Crown land in private. We do not need to
maintain a system that has shown itself to have failed in the past. Neither the
Mandarins in Whitehall nor the Governor in Government House is an acceptable
substitute for local scrutiny. Let the Government answer to the public for any
proposed dealing in public lands. We need the disinfecting powers of openness,
transparency and fresh air.
In
the case of the recently imposed 2010 Montserrat Constitution, there is
similarly no requirement for publication of and prior open discussion of dealings
in Crown land. The Governor and his Ministers will continue to deal with public
assets in private. The fear must be that we in Anguilla can expect that the
recommendation of the 2006 Anguilla Commission will similarly be ignored.
(iv)
Appointments Commission: At present in our Territories we have a ‘winner
takes all’ system of appointments to boards, committees and commissions. Immediately
a new government is appointed after general elections, the first order of
business is to terminate the previous political appointees and to share out the
various directorships among the principal supporters of the various new Ministers.
We watch as every five years they dismantle the Social Security Board,
the Public Utilities Board, the Public Health Board, the Tourist
Board, the Carnival Committee, even the Poor Law Board. We
call it “enjoying the fruits of office”. This system makes a mockery of the
whole notion of good governance. The public accepts it as a normal state of
affairs, but we sneer under our breath. This unregulated system has got to be
stopped if we are serious about good governance. We need to take a leaf out of
the British book and have all appointments vetted by an independent,
constitutionally established body.This will go some way to ensuring that
Ministers appoint only qualified persons to these positions. Given the
infrequency with which the situation develops, there is no need for a separate
Commission to be established. The functions can easily and effectively be
assigned to an existing office such as the Integrity Commissioner.
(v)
Codes of Ethics: In Anguilla after the February 2010 general election,
relations between the Governor and the newly elected Ministers collapsed. The
problem appears to have been that the members of the new government did not
know how Ministers are supposed to conduct themselves. For example, the new
Ministers attempted to enter into contracts binding on government, not being
aware of the correct procedure to follow. When their Permanent Secretaries
attempted to correct them, they were viewed as frustrating the Minister's
programme. Ministers then accused their Permanent Secretaries of joining with
the Governor in undermining them. The new Chief Minister delighted in being
abrasive in his relations with the Governor. Instead of requesting
of the Governor that he appoint an acting Chief Minister in his absence, he had
one of his Ministers write a memo to all Department Heads informing them that
he had been appointed as acting Chief Minister and directing them that they
should govern themselves accordingly. The Governor’s office was obliged to
circulate a memorandum to all departments advising that no such appointment had
been made.
In
Anguilla, as doubtless in other BOTs, persons in public life are not regularly
taken through seminars and workshops on the meaning of nepotism, cronyism, and
conflicts of interest.
Where, as is the case in Anguilla, basic honesty and integrity in our dealings
with others sometimes does not appear to be an ingrained part of our culture,
positive steps are required to be taken to train our Ministers, public
servants, directors of public and private boards, and committee members in the generally
accepted ethical rules. In Anguilla, this necessity has been recognized by the
public service. Civil servants have developed and adopted a Code of Ethics
to govern
themselves. Our judges have bound
themselves to a code of judicial conduct. Our lawyers have committed
to a binding code of ethics. If Civil Servants, Judges and Lawyers can have
them, why not all BOT public servants and politicians?
When,
at the request of an importuning constituent, a Minister telephones the
Sergeant at the Police Station to “give a chance” to a young person who has
been arrested, he thinks he is responding to the needs of his community. When
the Minister gives out work permits to one favoured building contractor, but
not to another, he says he is “levelling the playing field”. When the Minister
overrules a Chief Immigration Officer or a Planning Committee order, he says he
is only “showing a good heart”, and softening the harsh decisions of unfeeling
bureaucrats. But, it is quite the opposite: he is corrupting the system that
has been designed for the even-handed protection of all citizens.
It
is not as if we have to re-invent the wheel. The British Cabinet Office has
developed a series of handbooks to guide public servants and Ministers in the
correct protocols to be followed. Other Commonwealth countries
have excellent handbooks for Ministers, Legislators and other public officers. These
could easily be adapted for use in the BOTs. Any local legal draughtsman would
have no difficulty doing the adaptation. Then, there will require to be
training. Workshops for incoming Ministers, Boards of statutory corporations,
and public servants should be a regular feature of the local administration's
drive to achieve good governance.
In
Anguilla, the Governor has sole and total control of the civil service. Absolute
and unrestrained power rests
in his omnipotent hands. There does exist a Public Service Integrity Board to assist the Governor in his
monitoring of the public service. Its members are appointed by the Governor
under a governing Act.
The result has not been encouraging. This Board has turned out to be an
ineffective institution. Its sole function is to investigate those questions of
conflict of interest in the civil service that happen to be put to it by the
Governor. The Governor need not consult with the Board, except on an occasion
when it pleases him to do so. The Board has no power to respond to complaints
from the public or to institute an investigation of its own initiative. This is
most inadequate. There
is a real need instead for an Integrity Commissioner established by the
Constitution and supported by meaningful integrity laws and regulations.
The
2006 Anguilla Constitutional and Electoral Reform Commission recommended
the introduction of Codes of Ethics both at ministerial and at statutory board
levels. There has been no progress in this direction since the recommendation
was made. The new Montserrat Constitution does not mention the need for
any Code of Conduct or Code of Ethics to govern public life. The TCI
Recommendation is innovative,
but contains a sting in the tail. It is that the Integrity Commission be
required to publish, following wide consultation, a Code of Conduct for
Persons in Public Life. The Commission is then to keep the Code under
review, and to investigate, either in response to a complaint or on their own
initiative, any alleged failure to abide by the Code by those subject to it. This
recommendation would have been a major advance on the system in Anguilla and
Montserrat and would have been highly commendable if it had rested there.
[62] However, the TCI Recommendation
is for the introduction of a completely new structure, a Statement of
Governance Principles. The proposal is that each time the FCO appoints a
new Governor it will publish a new Statement that will set out how
government is to function and what standards are expected. The down side of
this proposal is that the Governor, under the new TCI Constitution, will be
specifically empowered to reject any advice to act, whether given to him by the
Premier, legislature, Cabinet, or independent body, if the Governor believes
that such action would be “in contravention of” the governance principles. This
is the sting in the tail previously referred to.
Such
a Statement by itself has much to commend it. What is objectionable
about the proposal is that it appears to have been made with the intention of
introducing an essentially undemocratic form of government under the guise of
improving good governance. There is no assurance that there will be a mechanism
for ensuring that the FCO determines the wishes and expectations of the people.
The risk is that the FCO may from time to time impose its own dubious and
unreliable notions of good governance. We cannot assume that the Statement
will be negotiated with the local
government. The likelihood is that it will be a Statement of foreign governance principles imposed
on us from outside. Such a proposal does not provide hope for the local
development of good governance mechanisms. As presently worded, it should be
repugnant to all right-thinking persons.
Particularly
objectionable is the proposal to empower the Governor to reject a measure
coming to him from the local Legislature for his assent. To have a Governor
empowered by administrative fiat to reject a law passed by the colonial Legislature
has not happened in the Leeward Islands since before the time of the General
Assembly in 1705. Only the strongest language is appropriate to condemn such a reactionary
recommendation.
The
situation in the TCI may be regrettable, but nothing justifies the proposal to
abrogate democratic government to the extent that is proposed. A more
acceptable proposal would have been to have the future TCI Constitution include
measures for the people of the TCI themselves to exercise increased democratic
control over errant Ministers. Those mechanisms include the whole range of
local, democracy-enabling measures which are dealt with in this paper.
We
have seen the provision that the Governor may enact a law without it having
passed through the Legislature. The TCI Recommendations
suggest rejuvenating and strengthening this provision in the case of any new
TCI Constitution. The proposal is that the Governor's powers should be widened
to allow him to legislate “to ensure compliance with the Governance
Principles”. A more objectionable recommendation it is difficult to imagine.
There
is no question of either the FCO or the Governor needing such draconian powers
in any BOT. We have seen what happened in Montserrat only a few years ago. In
my opinion, what the Governor did then was the correct way for legislation to
be made in a BOT. To remove the power of the local legislators to legislate for
their country is to destroy democracy itself. A constitutional framework such
as that proposed for the TCI has nothing of either democracy or of good
governance in it.
The
TCI Recommendations
include a proposal that the Constitution should provide that the Governor may
act contrary to the advice of Cabinet in an area of ministerial responsibility
if, in his view, no doubt supported by the FCO, to act in accordance with
Cabinet's advice would be contrary to the Statement. At first blush such
a proposal may seem acceptable on the basis that the Ministers having
negotiated the Statement with the FCO they should not be permitted to
act in breach of their commitment to act in accordance with it. The objection
is that it is an anti-democratic provision. It does nothing to promote and to
develop notions of good governance in the Territory. There is no reason to
suppose that a Governor will be seized of a greater sense of good governance
than anyone else. We have seen in Anguilla a Governor write
a letter saying that it was acceptable for the Chief Minister to continue in
his private-sector position as Chairman of the Board of a local bank having
major business dealings with government. More recently we have seen in Anguilla
a Governor defend
his appointment of an ex-Commissioner of Police on the day after the top cop
demitted office to serve on contract as one of the two Stipendiary Magistrates
for Anguilla, this despite the protestations of the local Bar Association. Both
of these actions amounted to major assaults on the rule of law and the
separation of powers, cornerstones of good governance.
To
put the issue of the Governor’s proposed power to overrule Cabinet in context,
it is to be remembered that the Governor chairs meetings of Cabinet. He is
accompanied there by his Deputy Governor and the Attorney-General as they
debate with Ministers the development of national policy. If, in the presence
of these worthy individuals, the Cabinet comes to a decision that some action
is needed in the interests of the country, it is simply not acceptable for the
Governor to be empowered unilaterally to act contrary to the advice. Such a
proposal involves a replacement of representative government by foreign,
arbitrary and dictatorial rule. It is by its nature a denial of good
governance.
We
await with some trepidation proposals for the development of Codes of Ethics,
Statements of Governance Principles and other instruments for the
encouragement and promotion of integrity in public life in Anguilla. The danger
is that if the system proposed for TCI is introduced into Anguilla, we shall
have been returned to an even more barbaric system of colonial administration
than we had in the past.
(b) Accountability. The second area of checks and balances that
promote good governance, and that one would expect to see given emphasis in a
modern BOT Constitution, after the general area of integrity, is that of
accountability. There are recognised devices, other than general elections
every 5 years, which ensure that government is held accountable for its actions
and omissions. These are traditionally considered to be (i) the Complaints Commissioner; (ii) the Police Complaints Authority; (iii) the Human Rights Commissioner; (iv) a Freedom of Information Act; and (v) the
Public Accounts Committee (PAC). Not
one of these vital mechanisms exists in Anguilla.
(i)
Complaints Commissioner: This is another name for the Ombudsman, one of the great human
rights inventions of the Scandinavians. Without an Ombudsman or Complaints
Commissioner, the citizen must rely for enforcing his complaint against an
unfair or biased public officer on going to Court. And, we all know how
expensive and unsatisfactory that can be. The Ombudsman, on the other hand, is
free of cost to the complaining citizen, is completely independent of any
politician or public servant, and reports only to the Legislature. Many of the
larger islands have a Complaints Commissioner, but few if any of the smaller
ones do. If the quarrel with the establishment of the office is the question of
its expense, there is no reason why the function of the Ombudsman should not be
combined with other watchdog functions.
The
precedent of a Complaints Commissioner being established in our Constitutions
has been set in Cayman Islands
and in Montserrat.
The TCI Recommendations contain a proposal
that the office be constituted for that territory in any new Constitution. It
would appear that Anguillians can with reasonable certainty expect that, if we
demand that a similar check and balance be inserted into our new Constitution,
the FCO will have no objection.
(ii)
Police Complaints Authority (PCA): At
present, complaints from the public against the conduct of a police officer are
heard and determined in secret by the Commissioner of Police. This system has
been found not to be transparent, and has led to public distrust. Bermuda,
Jamaica and St Lucia are examples of Commonwealth Caribbean countries that have
introduced new statutory civilian oversight bodies known as PCAs, though these
may only make recommendations to the Commissioner who retains the primary duty
to take disciplinary action against officers. In the UK the Independent Police Complaints Commission
has the power to take over a police complaints investigation and makes
recommendations to the relevant Chief Constable. In my view, it is not
satisfactory for complaints against police officers to be handled internally
and in secrecy as presently occurs in Anguilla. It is desirable that there be a
PCA provided for in any new Anguilla Constitution. There is no reason why in
the interests of reducing costs its functions cannot be combined with one or
other of the recommended watchdog institutions.
(iii)
Human Rights Commissioner: One of
the complaints frequently heard is that the citizen’s fundamental rights can
only be protected by the Anguillian individual at great personal cost. The
solution is to place the protection of the individual’s fundamental human rights
in the hands of a publicly funded institution. This is sometimes called the
Human Rights Commissioner or the Administrative
Justice Board.
There
are many different types of national human rights and administrative justice
institutions in the Commonwealth. They include Human Rights Commissions, Gender
Commissions, Racial Equality
Commissions, and Anti-discrimination
Commissions. Many of them operate in challenging environments of
corruption, violation of human rights, military coups and dictatorships. Such
administrative justice boards are typically given broader jurisdiction and
stronger powers than the classic model of the Ombudsman. Where they include the
functions of the Ombudsman and the Complaints Commissioner they are called the
‘hybrid model’. Those in both Ghana
and Tanzania
are empowered to take complaints to court to enforce their recommendations if
they have not been complied with in a specified period.
So
far as the West Indian BOTs are concerned, the Human Rights Commissioner has
been established by the Constitution
in the Cayman Islands. In Montserrat the Complaints Commission has
the job of “encouraging the resolution of human rights complaints”, which is to
say that in Montserrat the Commission has no power to make binding
recommendations. The TCI Recommendations
contain a proposal for such an office to be provided for in the new TCI
Constitution, but it is not clear what the powers will be.
What
is needed in all of our territories is the Ghanaian and Tanzanian model, where,
if mediation fails, the Commissioner can take a complaint to court on behalf of
the citizen who prefers not to seek private legal representation. To minimize
cost, a hybrid Complaints Board
could be empowered by the Constitution to deal with all the oversight matters
of corruption; conflicts of interest; abuse of office; police and prison
complaints; and ethics issues affecting Ministers of government, civil
servants, parliamentarians, and officers of statutory corporation.
(iv)
Freedom of Information (FOI) Act: In Anguilla it is nearly impossible to
obtain any information on the programmes or activities of any department of
government. This undesirable situation would be cured by an effective FOI Act. Freedom
of information legislation is also sometimes called “open records” law. There
is no surer mechanism for guaranteeing transparency than a FOI Act and the
various regulations that make it work
The
FOI Act is a law which sets rules on the access to information or records held
by government. Such a law defines the legal process by which government
information is required to be made available to the public on request. Sweden’s
Freedom of the Press Act of 1766 is thought to be the oldest of such
laws. Today, over 70 countries around the world have it. In the USA it is
described as “sunshine” law, as in “There
is no better disinfectant than sunshine”.
What
FOI legislation does is to alter the burden of proof. The burden of proving
that the matter requested should be kept confidential rests on the person who
argues that it must be kept confidential. The assumption is that the public has
a right to all information kept by government. You may ask for a copy of any
document without having to give any reason why you want it. If the information
is not disclosed, a valid reason has to be given. If the reason is
unacceptable, you can appeal to the Commissioner
of Information to make a ruling, and to enforce his ruling.
Not
only does the UK have such a law, but it was introduced in the Cayman Islands
by their 2009 Constitution.
On this precedent, there is no reason why Anguilla should not have this reform
if we should ask for it.
(v)
Public Accounts Committee (PAC): The PAC can be an effective mechanism
to enable members of the Legislature to question and to investigate the manner
in which public officers have spent the monies voted them by the Legislature. In
some territories, including Anguilla as of the time of writing, no PAC has ever
been appointed, far less functioned as it should. In Anguilla the PAC is not
established by the Constitution, but is mentioned only in the Assembly’s rules
of procedure.
We
all know the reasons for this relaxed state of affairs. Those presently in
government have no interest in setting up a tribunal that will expose the budgetary
wrongdoings that they may have been engaged in. Those who are presently in
opposition have no desire to start an institution that may perhaps haunt them
when their turn comes to be in power and their opportunity comes to misuse
public funds. The typical Governor has an interest in keeping the PAC quiet. He
wants to go back to London, after his term of winking at misconduct is up, with
no questions being asked that may prevent him from receiving his due pats on
the back and other accolades. Everyone, except the tax-paying public, has an
interest in silencing the PAC. On the other hand, Montserrat and the BVI have
long-existing and functioning PACs, and there should be no objection to
constitutionally establishing the institution in Anguilla if we were to demand
it.
(c)
Transparency. The third
key element of good governance is transparency. Contrary to public opinion,
most politicians are not engaged in making back-room deals and accepting
under-the-table packages. Only the insecure and the deceitful ones among our
leaders are afraid of transparency. The self-confident and the honest ones welcome
it: mechanisms and techniques for guaranteeing transparency give them the tools
to demonstrate their honesty, effectiveness and integrity.
It
is the lack of transparency in our systems of government that cause so many of
our Ministers’ actions to be wrongfully categorised as corrupt. Where the basis
for a decision is concealed, suspicions naturally arise. The obvious solution
is to institute systems that increase transparency. These include (i) the
appointment of civil servants, teachers and the police by Service Commissions; (ii) the exercise of the prerogative of mercy
by a locally appointed Mercy Committee;
(iii) the regular revision of electoral boundaries by an independent Boundaries Commission; (iv) the opening
up Cabinet Meetings and government
committee meetings to the press; (v) instituting the regular publication of
annual departmental reports; (vi)
holding post-Cabinet press conferences;
and (vii) providing for the appointment of a Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP). Let us now consider each of
these.
(i)
Service Commissions: In Anguilla, all appointments to the public service, the teaching service, and the police service, are in the hands of one
person, the Governor. He consults with a Public Service Commission (PSC), but
need not follow its recommendations. The thinking is that this mechanism
guarantees the independence of the civil service and protects public officers
from political interference.
While
this objective is honourable, the result in practice is the contrary. The
public is unlikely to accept that there is transparency and fairness in public
service appointments unless such appointments and related matters are
constitutionally placed in the hands of a local, professional, and independent
PSC, governed by the appropriate laws and regulations and trained in the
exercise of their functions.
The
new TCI Constitution
had one of the most advanced and democratic provisions for the governance of
the civil service. The Governor appointed the members of the PSC. He did so
acting on the recommendation of various stake-holders. The TCI PSC made the
decisions about appointments and conditions of service of public servants. The
Governor was required to implement their recommendations. This is as it should
be.
The
new TCI Recommendations
propose the complete emasculation of the previous TCI PSC and would give it a
completely useless role. It will become, as in Montserrat and Anguilla, a
merely consultative body, without any power. If the appointment system in the
TCI was not working, which the TCI Recommendations do not suggest, the solution
is not to destroy the PSC but to re-train its members. Members of all public
boards and committees, including Cabinet, need to be trained in their proper
functioning. Good governance is not achieved by having a country deprived of a
vital instrument for ensuring local self-rule.
In
the BVI
there are separate and independent Public Service, Teaching, Judicial and Legal
Services, and Police Commissions. The Governor acts on their advice, except in
the case of Department heads on whose appointment he consults with the Premier.
This is as it should be in every BOT at this time in our history. We have
recommended the
same for Anguilla.
To
put BOT public service appointments in the hands of an FCO functionary who may
be advised behind the scenes by those cronies that he and his superiors may
have selected, is not an acceptable alternative to an independent and
professional PSC. In any view, arbitrary one-man rule can never in any
circumstances be an improvement in good governance.
(ii)
Mercy Committee: In most of our territories, the Governor has the
Constitutional power
to function without any local Mercy Committee to advise him on what to
do about early releases from prison. A foreign diplomat would be unlikely to
have first-hand knowledge about who deserves to have his sentence shortened or
commuted. He must rely on the advice of some unknown advisers lurking in the
darkness around him. This is a most unsatisfactory state of affairs. In
Anguilla, we have recommended
that this power be exercised by a Mercy Committee with the Governor as
Chairman. It is uncertain whether this will find favour with the FCO.
(iii)
Boundaries Commission: In some of
our islands, in particular Anguilla, there has been no Boundaries Commission appointed for several decades. Some of the
political constituencies are a small fraction of others in the same Territory. Good
government demands that our people have more or less equal representation in the
Legislature. There is no reason why the modern practice of having the electoral
boundaries re-examined after every population census should not equally apply
in Anguilla. It is not clear that the FCO will favour the recommendation
to make this reform in Anguilla.
(iv)
Open Meetings: Open meetings legislation allows public access to
government meetings and ensures that their decisions are transparent and
publicised. The old, discredited practice, probably deriving from the Official
Secrets Act, of hiding every decision and action of a department of
government has proven itself not conducive to good governance. In California,
any decision not made in open meeting is voidable in a court of law. A similar
provision could be made for Anguilla now, but putting it in the Constitution
ensures it cannot be discontinued at whim. There is no reason why the
Constitution should not contain a clause requiring all governmental meetings
such as those of the Building Board and the Land Development Committee to be
open to the press and public, within reason. Yet, the FCO appears to have no
interest in insisting on this reform.
(v)
Departmental Reports: Departments
are generally expected to publish annual reports for laying before the Legislature.
This requirement was strictly enforced during the earlier colonial period. The
practice seems to have fallen into disuse in many departments of government of
the remaining BOTs. Their reports, if they are prepared, seldom reach even the
public library.
The
departments will deny that they have stopped reporting. They will claim that
they do submit their reports to their Ministers. That is not the issue. The
question is have they been published, or are they kept secret? I invite you to
visit any of the BOT websites and see for yourself if you can find any annual
departmental reports published on it. It is highly to be desired that members
of our Legislatures be more vigilant in insisting that Ministers expose the
workings of their Ministries and Departments to the people. Governors and
Deputy Governors should insist on publication. It would help ensure good
governance if the Constitution mentioned the requirement.
(vi)
Cabinet Press Conferences: We should
insist that Cabinet meetings are opened up to the public whenever possible. In
the Falkland Islands and Gibraltar post-cabinet press
conferences are regularly and diligently held so that the public may be
informed as to decisions taken in the public interest. Is it only the “white”
Overseas Territories
that have the self-confidence to hold a press conference immediately after
every Cabinet meeting?
(vii)
Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP):
Political considerations should never affect the enforcement of the criminal
law. Prosecutions of serious criminal charges should be separate and
independent of government. This is achieved by entrenching the DPP in the
Constitution and guaranteeing that his actions are to be performed without
interference from anybody. This has been done in the BVI.
By contrast, the reform was fudged in Montserrat.
Montserrat’s constitutional provision is that during any period when the office
of DPP is not filled the A-G shall perform his functions. The result is that
the office need never be filled, and the A-G may continue to carry out
prosecutions indefinitely. At present in Anguilla the A-G serves as prosecutor
in all serious charges tried in the criminal assizes. The A-G also sits in
Cabinet and rubs shoulder with the Governor and his Ministers. It is generally
accepted that it is not in the interests of good governance to have the
prosecutorial arm of government under the control of a Cabinet member. Such a
state of affairs offends against the doctrine of the separation of powers. It
will be an important reform if the Anguilla recommendation
for the appointment of a DPP is carried out.
Conclusions
The recommendations above are all to the effect
that locally-managed mechanisms for improving democracy and good governance in
Anguilla and the other remaining BOTs in the West Indies be established by their
Constitutions. Such mechanisms will promote self-government and
self-determination. They ensure good governance. They do not rely on a deus ex machina in the person of the
Governor or the FCO to achieve this desirable effect.
Since the
introduction of the universal suffrage in the West Indies after the Second
World War, democracy has flourished in these islands. If bad government has
arisen in the Overseas Territories it has done so under the supervision and
tutelage of the FCO and its appointed Governors. Reducing the right of the
people of a BOT to govern ourselves in the name of good governance is an
oxymoron. Replacing elected members of the local government by unelected
officials from outside the West Indies is no assurance of an improvement in
government. Local politicians may not always have the highest integrity, morals
or standards. But, at least they are accountable to the electorate. The same
cannot be said for foreign officials. In any event, an undemocratic form of
government is the opposite of good governance.
Ever since the
1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights we in the West Indies BOTs
have enjoyed as a matter of international law a right to self-determination and
self-government. The FCO legislating for us without our consent, except in the
most extreme case of emergency, such as the outbreak of war, would be a denial
of this right to self-government. The FCO legislating for a BOT in relation to
its domestic issues is a process generally to be condemned when it occurs. Any
recommendation to this effect is retrograde, colonialist and undemocratic.
When power is
transferred from the elected Ministers to the Governor, we depend for good
governance on the character of the man. A strong and fair Governor may well do
no harm, and may do some good. A weak or accommodating Governor is unlikely to
make good use of his increased powers and may well do a great deal of harm. Not
only are foreign officials not accountable to the local citizenry, some of them
have been patently incompetent. Others have not had a care for the interests of
the people they are supposed to govern. It would be preferable for us to depend
instead on institutions designed to guarantee democracy and good governance. The
whole notion of replacing democracy by the arbitrary rule of one individual is
repulsive.
The
constitutional reform exercise in Montserrat was conducted in secrecy
and without consultation of the people. The people of Montserrat were never
told what proposals were being considered and were never informed about the
issues or of the alternatives that were being discussed. At no time were the
people of Montserrat invited to make a contribution to the draft Constitution. This
was published for the first time just weeks before being approved by the
Government-dominated Legislature. The final draft Constitution as approved by
the Legislature was not shown to Montserratians until after it had been passed
by the Privy Council. The process of constitutional reform followed by the FCO
legal advisers in Montserrat exemplified an undemocratic and unaccountable
exercise of power and contempt for the citizens of a British Overseas Territory.
The fear is that the same process may be attempted in Anguilla.
In
a BOT the process of government depends for its smooth running on a good
working relationship between the Governor and the Chief Minister. Unfortunately,
since the commencement of the present Administration in Anguilla, that has not
occurred. The Chief Minister has on a number of occasions published press
releases accusing the Governor of misconduct.
The Governor has responded by publishing a number of his own press releases
pouring scorn on the Chief Minister and his Ministers.
The
Chief Minister of Anguilla has admittedly made mistakes in his dealings with
the Governor and the FCO. He signed a letter authorising the Social Security
Board to borrow US$200 million secured by the Social Security Fund without
having first raised the matter in Cabinet or got its approval. He attempted to
have the Governor appoint a “de facto”
fifth Minister, when the Constitution provides for a maximum of four Ministers.
He authorised one of his Ministers to attend a general meeting of a statutory
corporation with a view to replacing the Board of Directors with his nominees.
This should have been a government decision, not a party one. He should first
have secured the approval of Cabinet to replace the old directors, which he had
not done. These are, no doubt, the tip of the iceberg as far as the Governor is
concerned, but they demonstrate the difficulty from the Governor's point of view,
in working with the present Administration.
The
Governor has also made constitutional mistakes and been guilty of bad
governance. The Governor has refused to comply with the Chief Minister's advice
to remove portfolios from Ministers and to transfer them to other Ministers, in
contravention of the constitutional provision.
The Governor has refused to accept into any government office a Member of the Legislature
who crossed the floor to join the Government benches on the mistaken ground
that he would not permit two men, the Governor and the Chief Minister, to
subvert the democratic process. His understanding, as he published it, was that
the people had made their choice and elected certain representatives to the Opposition
and certain other representatives to the Government. In his mistaken view it
was a corruption of the democratic process for him to accept the crossing of
the floor by the Opposition member. He is alleged to have asked the Chief
Minister to resign.
These misunderstandings of the constitutional provisions have considerably
weakened the Governor’s position in the eyes of the public. The consequence has
been the Chief Minister publicly and daily accusing the Governor of conspiring
with the Opposition to bring down his Administration.
Needless to say, the supporters of the Government and of the Opposition
continue to goad both the Governor and the Chief Minister to batter at each
other. The Chief Minister has written letters to the UK Minister baiting him to
reply on the various issues.
None of this bodes well for the constitutional advance of Anguilla.
The likelihood
is that without a paradigm shift in the attitude of the FCO towards the issue
of good governance in the BOTs, the relationship between the remaining Overseas
Territories and the FCO will most likely come to be characterised as one of
oppression and regression, rather than partnership and progress.
No meaningful
constitutional reform or progress can proceed in the atmosphere that presently
prevails in Anguilla between the Governor and the locally elected government. As
there has been so little real progress made in our neighbouring West Indian BOTs
in the institution of good governance measures in their Constitutions or in
their laws, as illustrated above, we in Anguilla cannot expect that the FCO, as
it presses for the usual additions to our fundamental rights clauses in our
Constitution to bring us into compliance with the human rights concerns of the
European Union, will pay any greater attention to the issue during the year
2011.
If this
forecast of mine is accurate, there will be a great deal of talk of good
governance, but no real progress made in the coming years. The opportunity for meaningful
constitutional advance and the buttressing of good government will have been
lost to Anguilla. We shall eventually be sent, like the other West Indian
territories were, off into independence burdened with a wholly inadequate and
defective Constitution. Our citizens will be left to the mercy of vindictive
and corrupt politicians and public servants unconstrained by any of the obvious
protections that could so easily have been installed.
THE END
